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ABSTRACT 
Development of remote regions in the circumpolar north has been 
the subject of much academic, political, and community discourse. 
This thesis examines the effects that two different fisheries 
management regimes, the Western Alaska CDQ program and 
Greenland's Inshore Shrimp Fishery, have on community development. 
It briefly describes the natural environments, the resident peoples and 
their histories, and present socio-economic conditions of the regions 
that participate in the two programs. It then reviews relevant 
development literature, and, based on that review, selects criteria 
for evaluation and comparison. This thesis analyzes the two regimes, 
and supporting programs, on issues of control, adequacy of resource 
base, amount and availability of capital, employment created, social 
organization of work production, reliance on existing skills and 
fostering of new ones, and long-term political viability. It concludes 
that market-based resource regimes hold dangers for indigenous 
residents of remote regions. However, establishing community rights 
to resources, rather than individual ownership, appears to mitigate 
some of the dangers. Moreover, as seen in the CDQ program, 
community-rights frameworks can exist within larger individual-
oriented, market-based regimes. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
Chapter One: Introduction 
This thesis examines the effects that fisheries management regimes 
have on community-level economic development in rural areas of 
Alaska and Greenland. It compares two distinct models of 
development policy and assesses how effectively each model 
enables indigenous residents of these remote regions to accomplish 
desired forms of social and economic change. 
1.1 CHALLENGES OF NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT 
The challenges of development in northern hinterlands are great. 
Armstrong et al. ( 1979: 1) define the circumpolar north as "a 
convenient abbreviation for the Arctic and sub-Arctic." The climate 
of the circumpolar north is demanding, the environment "fragile," and 
the distance to large markets in the temperate zones vast (Hoel 1993: 
15-16). Further, these factors combine to ensure that conventional 
development requires extraordinarily high levels of capital (/bid.), 
often in short supply in northern regions. It, therefore, comes as no 
surprise that development rarely occurs, succeeding only when the 
supply of a resource is large enough, or world prices high enough, to 
support it (Flanders 1992). 
Moreover, when development does occur, it seldom benefits long-
term residents of the region and rural, indigenous residents in 
particular. While indigenous interests concerning the circumpolar 
north's resources are more "intense" than those of other residents 
(Young 1996), they are poorly situated to take advantage of 
conventional economic activity based on those resources. This is 
because they generally lack formal education and job skills, capital, 
title to or control over the resources themselves, and access to and 
influence with governmental organizations. Complicating matters 
further, indigenous social and cultural values often conflict with 
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conventional models of proper work behavior and goals. For 
example, full-time work can interfere with traditional subsistence 
activities. 
As a result, the machinery and camps associated with northern 
development projects stand in stark contrast to most rural, indigenous 
villages and settlements. High-tech oil rigs and gas-handling facilities, 
multi-million dollar catcher-processor boats, and mines that extract 
ore from deep within permafrost seem to share more with NASA's 
space vehicles than with the world of substandard housing, fish-drying 
racks, and yards full of broken ski-doos and outboard motors. In the 
past, the two traditional schools of thought concerning development 
only reinforced the disparity; in one, Natives should forget their 
"quaint, antiquated ways" and join the "modern world," or, in the 
other, as representatives of "our noble savage past," they should be 
sheltered from the evil influences of capitalism and other modern ills. 
1.2 THE VILLAGE ECONOMY 
While both schools still have their adherents, many now recognize 
that the "village economy" incorporates elements of, yet is distinct 
from, either the traditional or the "industrial" model (Ross and Usher 
1986: 142). Put another way, the village economy incorporates and 
values a higher level of "informal" economic activity than that found 
in industrial, or wage, economies. At the same time, it still includes 
"formal," or wage, elements (Ibid.). Therefore, if any development is 
going to succeed in meeting the needs of the rural, indigenous 
residents of the circumpolar north, it must accommodate elements of 
both traditional and wage economies. This caution is an important 
one because indigenous ·groups, like any community or population, 
"are not passive recipients of development." (Young, 1995: 39). They 
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have collectively, and as individuals, their own visions of the future of 
their communities. 
The persistence of the informal and traditional part of the village 
economy probably results from both cultural and practical 
circumstances, for lack of better terminology. In the first place, 
Native peoples value aspects of the informal economy as activities 
that sustain their sense of community and cultural identity. 
Subsistence hunting and gathering, sharing of catch, manufacture of 
traditional goods all bind the community together and to their shared 
history. In the second, traditional activities also provide goods that 
they either could not afford in the marketplace or are simply not 
available to them (Bosworth 1995). 
However, since the introduction of the fur trade, Natives have 
produced goods for exchange with the "industrial" economy (Ross 
and Usher 1986: 144). Always incorporating whatever technology 
suited their needs, indigenous northerners have long made use of 
items provided by the industrial economy. They take wage-earning 
jobs or sell products of the tundra, taiga, and sea to obtain rifles, 
outboard motors, snow machines, all-terrain vehicles, and the like. 
Tensions arise, however, because the two interconnected economies 
often compete with each other for land, labor, and capital. Further, 
because of the nature of the links between them, the growth of the 
industrial economy adversely affects the informal economy, and thus, 
the village economy (/bid.). Caught by these powerful and conflicting 
currents, the challenge facing the indigenous people of the 
circumpolar north is great, though not the one often depicted by the 
popular media. Instead of a clear cut choice between an 
acculturated, urban, industrial future and an idealized, romantic past, 
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they must instead attempt to find a proper balance between the 
formal and informal activities that compose a village economy and 
sustain their way of life (Ibid.}. 
1.3 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
As noted above, indigenous peoples generally lack the resources and 
skills to set their own agenda and make a future that includes a 
healthy village economy. · Private operators rarely have the incentive 
to focus on this goal. Therefore, government programs provide most 
of the developmental assistance (Young 1995). These efforts do not 
exist in a vacuum, though. Governments labor under many different, 
and sometimes conflicting, duties and obligations. Urban residents, 
whether close by or thousands of miles away, whether sharing the 
same cultural history or not, do not always understand or support 
costly projects directed towards small, remote, and seemingly 
unproductive minorities. Even if they do, public funds are limited, and 
other needs demand attention and resources. 
While the future of so many people rests on government efforts, 
governments, in turn, have few resources with which to address the 
problem. This thesis examines the attempts of two different 
governments to foster development by allocating similar types of 
natural resources among similar groups of rural, coastal, indigenous 
residents of the circumpolar north. While terms such as "sustainable 
development," "community" or "appropriate development," 
"informal economy," and "next economy" have become part of the 
vernacular in the last decade and have received attention in 
academic circles, policy makers have few concrete lessons, besides 
past failures, from which to proceed. Successful models are few. This 
thesis will provide policy makers and academics with a comparison of 
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two dramatically different approaches to development, and, 
thereby, provide a common basis for discussion and decision-making. 
1.4 CASES FOR STUDY 
The areas selected for scrutiny, Western Alaskan villages on the Bering 
Sea and Greenlandic settlements along its ice-free coastline, share 
many elements of a common history, besides a past rooted in hunter-
gatherer traditions. Briefly, the indigenous or aboriginal peoples of 
these areas endured colonization by Europeans and North Americans, 
interested in resources for exploitation, and by missionaries intent on 
their religious conversion. Hitherto unknown diseases decimated their 
populations. Government policies changed from neglect, benign or 
otherwise, to assimilation. More recently, they have gained some 
measure of self-determination. In Alaska, Natives reached accord 
with the federal government in 1971, receiving outright title to some 
lands and resources and regional and village corporations charged 
with the dual purpose of making a profit and providing for the welfare 
of Native shareholders. In Greenland, residents attained home rule in 
1979 and now oversee their domestic affairs. Given these 
circumstances, several authors have noted "the similar socio-cultural 
situation" in Alaska and Greenland and commented on similar social 
phenomena and trends (Hamilton et al. 1996: 89; Stenbaek 1987). 
In both areas, government is the largest employer, and the fishing 
industry, a distant second, is the largest private-sector employer. In 
the Bering Sea, trawlers, largely owned by corporations based out of 
the state, harvest enough pollack to make it the largest fishery in the 
world (Townsend 1996). Similarly, Greenlandic waters account for one 
third of global catches of the northern shrimp (Poole 1996). In both 
cases, though, the benefits of these enterprises rarely reach the rural, 
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indigenous people living on the coasts. Neither fishery focuses on a 
species harvested traditionally, and both require capital outlays 
beyond the means of the local residents. It is this dichotomy between 
high-tech and capital-intensive fisheries and isolated, cash-poor, 
indigenous communities to which the title of this thesis, "Little Fish in 
Big Ponds," refers. 
In addressing the challenges to development for these people, 
however, the respective governments have adopted radically 
different approaches, particularly in this decade, but during earlier 
years as well. This is not surprising in that the governments operate 
within different traditions of political and economic thought. The 
Greenland Home Rule Authority (GHRA) has, at least for now, largely 
adopted the social democratic ways of the Danish Kingdom, and the 
State of Alaska, while exceptional in many ways, mostly operates in 
ways familiar to the democratic and capitalist notions of the rest of 
the United States. This thesis critically examines the outcomes of the 
two very different systems intended to provide for the residents of 
these similar areas. Specifically, it focuses on the Western Alaska 
Community Development Quota (CDQ) program and Greenland's 
inshore shrimp fishery (GISF) and the government support for 
participants in that fishery. While different in origin and method, both 
fulfil! the same role, providing a primary source of community 
development based on a fishery resource. 
1.5 AIMS OF THESIS 
Based on a review of pertinent remote-regions and community-
development literature, this thesis evaluates the effects of these 
resource regimes, and relevant supporting programs, on several 
levels. 
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• It discusses the locus of control for each regime; 
• it examines the size of the resource base and amount 
of capital in each system and assesses the way in which 
both are made available to communities; 
• it documents the number and type of employment 
opportunities provided by each regime and discusses 
expected trends; 
• it analyzes the social organization of work production in 
both programs; 
• it outlines the training and educational opportunities 
provided by each system; and 
• it discusses the political viability of each program and 
related issues of social equity. 
Given the amount of material and data available on each program, 
this thesis cannot be an exhaustive examination of the subject. It can 
only begin the process. 
The vulnerability of resource-based economies in northern remote 
regions to outside market prices, and possible solutions, lies outside 
the scope of this thesis. For an investigation of that issue, see Pretes 
( 1993), Pretes and Robinson ( 1989), Knowler ( 1989), or Sugden ( 1982). 
The fisheries management literature abounds with critiques of 
management methods and how effectively they conserve fish stocks 
(et. Copes 1986; Town send and Wilson 1987). For the purposes of this 
thesis, it is assumed that the governments of the United States and 
Greenland manage fishery stocks equally and adequately. Thus, this 
thesis concentrates on the social and economic effects of the 
fisheries management regimes, rather than their respective abilities 
to achieve conservation goals. 
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1.6 DEFINITIONS 
Because of their central importance to the issue at hand, several 
terms require immediate definition. Otherwise, terms are defined on 
an as needed basis. In the first place, the areas under scrutiny are 
considered "remote regions" in the sense outlined by Huskey and 
Morehouse ( 1992: 129): 
Remote regions are "distant from large, urban, industrial and 
political centers, and they are sparsely settled. Most of them 
contain Native or indigenous populations as well as non-Native 
immigrants. and they have a mix of traditional and Western 
institutions. Typically they have limited market opportunities, 
and they are dependent on natural resource exports, 
government transfers, and subsistence activities. The costs of 
doing public and private business are high. Important 
decisions affecting these areas are made in distant 
metropolitan centers. These regions lack both political 
autonomy and economic self-sufficiency [emphasis added]." 
Importantly, the boundaries of remote regions are not solid lines. 
Instead, they are "permeable" and shift according to perspective 
(Ibid.), though the areas considered here will be bound by legal and 
political definitions. Remote regions are also "rural," and that term is 
used to describe residents of those regions. 
"Development'' is "the process of overcoming obstacles to desired 
forms of change" by the inhabitants of an area, both indigenous and 
immigrants (/bid.). "Community development" serves to emphasize 
the importance of the character of development desired by many 
indigenous residents of remote regions. The goal of community 
development is not simply job creation at any cost. "Rationalize" 
means to improve efficiency, and efficiency "is gained by reducing 
capital and labor expenditures." (McCoy et al. 1995: 105) "Regime" 
denotes the set of institutions that control the management of a 
resource (Young, 1982). 
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The United Nations International Labor Organization's Convention 169 
(in Marantz 1996: 145) defines indigenous peoples as: 
"peoples in independent countries who are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations 
which inhabited the country ... at the time of conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries 
and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions," 
and it is used in that manner here. The word "Native" is herein used 
interchangeably with indigenous. It is capitalized to be consistent 
with its use in Alaska to denote a member of any of the many 
indigenous groups from the state (Tabbert 1991: 53), though applied 
similarly to indigenous Greenlanders. A number of non-indigenous 
people participate in both the CDQ program and the inshore fishery, 
though neither constitute a large percentage (Ginter 1995; Poole 
pers. comm.). 
1.7 OVERVIEW 
The structure of the thesis is straightforward. Chapter Two briefly 
describes the physical environment of the Bering Sea coast and 
adjacent waters, the resident people and their history, and the socio-
economic conditions in the villages included in the Alaskan CDQ 
program. It also sets the stage by describing the Bering Sea pollack 
fishery and by giving a rough outline of how the CDQ program 
functions. Chapter Three mirrors Chapter Two, only it focuses on 
Greenland, Greenlandic waters, and the Greenlanders from towns 
and settlements that participate in the inshore shrimp fishery. It also 
describes the offshore shrimp fishery and outlines the management 
regime of the inshore shrimp fishery. Chapter Four reviews community-
development literature relating to indigenous peoples living in 
remote regions of the Arctic. It then identifies commons themes and 
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elements necessary for successful development found in the 
literature. Chapter Five takes those themes and tackles the specific 
details available on the programs. Finally, Chapter Six synthesizes and 
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(adapted from Ginter 1995: 149) 
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Chapter Two: Western Alaska and the CDQ Program 
Alaska is one of the youngest of the fifty states of the United States 
and is its largest, roughly equal to one-fifth the size of the rest of the 
country. Purchased from Russia in 1867, it was administered as a 
federal territory for almost one hundred years. It became a state in 
1959. In essence, the state government manages anadromous and 
inland fisheries, such as salmon and herring, while the federal 
government controls fisheries that take place mainly in the 200 mile 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The federal government is also 
responsible for dealing with Alaskan Natives, because the 
relationship, legally speaking, was originally at the level of sovereign 
nations. The CDQ program is jointly administered by the federal and 
state governments. Basically, federal authorities retain control over 
the fisheries aspect of the program, whilst the state deals with 
developmental concerns. CDQ regulations, and the subsequent laws, 
limit the program to communities lying no more than fifty nautical 
miles from the Bering Sea and not on the coast of the Gulf of Alaska. 
This neatly defines the area of study. 
2.1 THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE, AND RESOURCES 
2.1.1 BERING SEA COAST 
The Bering Sea coast consists of a wide variety of geographical forms 
and features. The more than fifty Aleutian Islands are a chain of low, 
volcanic mountains, with steeps slopes jutting from the sea. The 
Aleutian Chain, as the islands are commonly known, extends for some 
1,100 miles (National Research Council 1996: 32). Many of the 
volcanoes are still active, and the Aleutian Chain and Southwest 
Alaska in general comprise one of the most seismically active areas 
of the world. Proceeding to the north, much of the coast of Bristol 
Bay and the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta (Y-K Delta) area are 
characterized by low-lying tidal flats, with lakes, ponds, and tundra. 
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Much of the ground that is not solid rock contains permafrost, or 
quasi-permanently frozen ground. 
Because of the dominating influence of the ocean, temperatures in 
the Aleutians rarely dip below 0°C in the winter or rise above l 6°C in 
summer. As one follows the coastline northward, though, average 
winter temperatures drop dramatically, generally ranging between 
- l 8°C and -35°C. Throughout the entire area, trees are absent or rare, 
and low, ground-hugging shrubs, grasses, sedges, mosses, and lichens 
dominate the landscape. However, the specific plant communities 
vary by region; long grasses predominate in much of the Aleutians, 
and tundra covers the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta. Vast numbers of 
waterfowl migrate to breed and nest on the tundra, and countless 
sea birds nest in rookeries along the coast. Caribou and other land 
mammals populate the Alaska Peninsula and other areas in significant 
numbers, and moose inhabit the inland areas of the Y-K Delta. 
The Bering Sea coast is generally lacking in commercially significant 
non-renewable, or mineral, resources, with a few exceptions. Most 
notably, the beaches of Nome on the Seward Peninsula contained 
one of the largest gold deposits in North America. While the boom 
lasted only from 1899 to 1912 (Cole 1991), some small-scale miners still 
scour the sand and gravel found there. Other gold mining ghost 
towns dot the Seward Peninsula, and the village of Platinum in Bristol 
Bay hosted a small, short-lived mining operation for its namesake 
earlier in this century. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
federal government began the process of leasing offshore areas in 
Bristol Bay for oil and gas exploration. These efforts were abandoned 
due to pressure from commercial fishing and Native interests. Finally, 
residents of Unalaska-Dutch Harbor are currently investigating the 
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geothermal potential of Makushin volcano to provide power to their 
city's needs (Blazer,R. pers. comm.). 
2.1.2 BERING SEA 
Framed on the north by the Seward and Chukchi Peninsulas, mainland 
Siberia and the Kamchatka Peninsula on the west and southwest, the 
1,900 km long ridge and island chain that makes up the Aleutians to 
the south, and mainland Alaska to the east, the Bering Sea covers 
almost 3 million km2. Geographically, it stretches from 162° east to 
157° west longitude and lies between 52° and 66° north latitude 
(National Research Council 1996). The Bering Sea can be divided into 
three main areas: the continental shelf, the Aleutian Basin, and the 
Aleutian Islands. The extensive continental shelf underlies 
approximately 40% of the whole Bering Sea, shown in Figure 2. 1 
(Ginter 1995). 
Sea-water exchange occurs in three main areas. Water flows 
outward through the Bering Strait into the Chukchi Sea. In the western 
Bering Sea, the Kamchatka current runs outward and south into the 
Oyashio mixing region. Saltwater flows into the Bering Sea from the 
Pacific through gaps in the Aleutian Islands, creating a large, nutrient 
rich mixing zone (National Research Council 1996). The Yukon and 
Kuskokwim rivers drain thousands of square miles of Alaska and 
Canada, providing substantial freshwater and nutrient input. Annual 
winter ice cover and the maximum ice edge extent vary 
considerably. In 197 4-7 6, the edge was at 56°-56.5°N, and in 1978-79 it 
extended to 58°-58.75°N (/bid.). This is roughly as far south as the 
Pribilof Islands and Bristol Bay and somewhat further south along the 
coast. 
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The Bering Sea supports at least 450 species of fish, crustaceans, and 
mollusks; 50 species of sea birds; and 25 species of marine mammals. 
The indigenous peoples of the region have utilized the fish, bird, and 
marine mammals since the last ice age, and Japanese, Russian, and 
American commercial interests, among others, have harvested 
animals from the Bering Sea since the 17th century. These historical 
harvests consisted mainly of sea otter furs, seals and sea lions for fur 
and oil, and whales for baleen and oil. The first salmon cannery in the 
region was built near the Moravian Mission in Bristol Bay in 1884 
(Kresge et al. 197 4), and the first commercial bottomfish fisheries, 
targeting cod, began about the same time (National Research 
Council 1996). Today, approximately 25 species of fish, crustaceans, 
and mollusks occur in commercially significant numbers (Ibid.). 
2.2 PEOPLE 
2.2.1 PRE-HISTORY 
At the time of historical contact with Europeans and Americans, a 
diverse group of people inhabited the Bering Sea region. In all, five 
distinct cultural groups, the Siberian Yupik of St. Lawrence Island and 
part of the Seward Peninsula, the lnupiat (part of the widely 
distributed Inuit people) of the Seward Peninsula and slightly south 
along the coast to near the mouth of the Yukon river, the Central 
Yupik of the Y-K Delta area and Bristol Bay, the Alutiiq (or Koniag 
Eskimo) on the Alaskan Peninsula, and the Aleuts of the Aleutian 
Islands, called this area home. All spoke mutually unintelligible 
languages, held varying spiritual beliefs, and sustained themselves 
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Despite these differences, some common cultural threads may be 
noted. Among all these peoples, daily life required an intense 
relationship with the natural world around them. They hunted land 
and sea mammals, fished, and collected birds eggs and berries, 
according to their availability by region. Their spiritual or religious 
belief systems incorporated these plants and animals, most of which 
possessed a spirit or soul. Known as animism, these systems of belief 
required observance of taboos, respect, and reciprocity between the 
Native peoples, and the natural entities. Generally, shamans 
specialized in mediating between people and natural entities, curing 
the sick, and ensuring the abundance of wild animals on which all 
depended. 
2.2.2 HISTORY 
Vitus Bering, a Danish explorer in the service of the Russian Czar, and 
his men encountered Aleuts in the Shumagin Islands, south of the 
Alaska Peninsula, in 17 41 . This marked the first direct contact 
between Europeans and Alaskan Natives. Elsewhere, contact with 
Europeans and Americans varied by time and type according to the 
resources of the region and by pure chance, shown in Table 2.1 . 
Table 2.1 









(adapted from Langdon 1987: 4) 
The Russians soon returned in large numbers seeking furs, mainly sea 
otter pelts, and claimed all of what is now Alaska. While much of their 
interest focused on Kodiak Island, Prince William Sound, and southeast 
Alaska, they also established missions and fur-trapping posts on rivers 
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throughout Bristol Bay and the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta. By the mid-
nineteenth century, they had virtually exterminated the sea otters, 
foreign whalers had begun to seek their prey along the northwest 
coast of Alaska, and wars in Europe and Asia diverted the Russians' 
attentions. Accordingly, they sold Alaska to the United States in 1867. 
For almost three quarters of a century, little changed in the lives of 
the Alaskan Natives. However, as mentioned earlier, the Nome gold 
rush of 1899, brought ten to fifteen thousand fortune-seekers to the 
Seward Peninsula in two to three years. When the gold largely 
disappeared, most of them did as well. The rest of the region had only 
sporadic contact with outsiders, limited to whaling crews to the 
North, merchant companies buying pelts, the beginnings of 
commercial fisheries in Bristol Bay and the Aleutians, and the 
occasional missionary. 
World War II marked a turning point in Alaskan history and the lives of 
Alaskan Natives. With the Japanese occupying Kiska and Attu Islands 
in the Aleutians, the United States government and military 
responded. Almost all Aleuts were forcibly removed from their island 
homes, kept in miserable accommodations in Southeast Alaska, and 
largely ignored for the remainder of the war. Elsewhere, the military 
created listening posts and staging areas with airports. They also 
organized local Native scouts and militias. The cold war saw the 
establishment of Distant Early Warning and White Alice stations along 
the coastline. 
On January 3, 1959, Alaska became the forty-ninth state of United 
States of America. Significantly, one of the major arguments for 
statehood was to establish more control over fisheries. The limited 
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tax base of the new state, combined with the strongly individualistic 
sentiments of Alaskans, brought few changes to rural Alaska. 
However, in 1968, the discovery of a massive oil field underlying 
Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope quickly set events in motion. First, to 
establish clear title to the oil-rich lands and establish a pipeline 
corridor to transport the oil, the federal government needed to 
resolve issues surrounding Native Alaskans' claims to aboriginal title 
to the state. In three years, oil companies, environmental groups, 
Natives, and state and federal officials rapidly negotiated a 
settlement, and Congress passed the Alaskan Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) in December of 1971. 
In return for surrender of aboriginal title, ANCSA created twelve, for-
profit regional corporations charged with the welfare of their Native 
shareholders. The act endowed them with nearly $1 billion dollars and 
lands, equaling roughly 14% of the state, including some sub-surface 
rights, making Native corporations the largest private land owners in 
Alaska. It also created numerous village corporations to function at 
the local level. Importantly, the regional corporations held title to 
lands which could now be sold or lost through bankruptcy. Concern 
over this and other provisions, led to a series of changes to ANCSA in 
1987. Amendments made at that time allow corporations to deed 
lands to land trusts to hold them in perpetuity (McNabb 1992). 
2.2.3 PRESENT SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
According to the 1990 census figures, Western Alaska is one of the 
most underdeveloped areas of Alaska and the United States as a 
whole. The fifty-six communities that lie within the CDQ region and 
participate in the program contained a total population of 21,037, 
with an average community size of 390. More than 25% live below the 
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poverty level. Much of the available housing is substandard, and 
customary utilities such water and phones are scarce. Five gallon 
plastic buckets or outhouses remain the primary means of sewage 
disposal in over half of the communities. 
78% of Western Alaska residents identify themselves as Native 
Americans, and for most older residents, English is a second language 
or not spoken at all. Residents under the age of sixteen constitute a 
large proportion of the total population, reaching 40% in some areas. 
The civilian labor force, limited largely by those choosing not to 
participate in the wage economy, makes up only 59% of the 
population aged 16 to 65. Within that labor force, unemployment 
ranges by area from 9% to 31 %. Federal, state, ond local government 
in the form of schools, health-care centers, airports, law-enforcement 
departments, and military bases employ almost 50% of all workers. 
Only a few roads link communities; none connect with the rest of 
Alaska. Most communities are totally isolated. Boats in summer, 
snowmachines in winter, and planes provide the only transportation. 
The necessary reliance on air transportation dramatically increases 
the cost of durable and consumer goods. As noted above, 
employment opportunities are few, and direct government transfer 
programs, such as the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), the 
Alaska Longevity Bonus, and the federal Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), commonly known as welfare, provide 
much of the cash income. A 1994 study found that the PFD, an 
amount close to $1,000 per resident in recent years, constituted 25% 
of the income of the poorest l 0% of Alaskans, largely those residing in 
rural areas such as Western Alaska (Goldsmith 1994). As one might 
expect from these statistics, Western Alaskan communities 
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experience many of the social ills associated with poverty, isolation, 
and cultural change. Suicide rates, particularly among young males, 
and teenage pregnancies are high. Abuse of alcohol and other 
substances is common, and a sense of despair pervades many 
communities. 
2.2.4 PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
While technology has changed over time, and cash is often required 
for subsistence pursuits, hunting, fishing, and gathering provide a large 
portion of food for residents of the CDQ region. Defined in state 
regulations as "the customary and traditional use of naturally 
occurring wild resources for food, clothing, art, crafts, sharing, and 
customary trade," subsistence activities also rank highly as a 
preferred occupation, often above wage labor (Bosworth 1995: 155) . 
The average resident consumes 437 pounds of subsistence foods, 
primarily fish, annually (State of Alaska: 1995). While Natives often 
stress the cultural importance of subsistence activities and sharing of 
traditional foods, the replacement costs, figured at $6 to $11 per 
kilogram, would be staggering for most households (Calloway 1995: 
157). 
Over twenty-five years, the ANCSA regional corporations have grown 
and experienced mixed success. Unfortunately, the four regional 
corporations that comprise the CDQ region are four of the five 
poorest financial performers (Colt 1991). Though several manage 
minor annual dividends, based on stock and bond holdings, for 
shareholders, business venture successes are few and shareholder 
employment minimal. Calista Corporation, which has more 
shareholders than any other ANCSA regional corporation, had the 
lowest total equity of any corporation, $6 million, in 1990 (/bid.). Figure 
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2.2 displays the book equity per shareholder of each ANCSA re
gional 
corporation in the CDQ region. Listed in alphabetical order, they are: 
1) Aleut Corp., 2.) Bering Straits Native Corp. 3.) Bristol Bay Native 
corp. and 4.) Calista Corp. The bars show dollars per shareholder. 
Figure 2.2: 
Book Equity per Shareholder of ANCSA Regional Corporations 
of the CDQ Region in 1990 
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(adapted from Colt 1991: 4) 
The greatest amount of private employment anywhere in the region 
results from the Bristol Bay salmon fishery, centered primarily on 
Dillingham, and local herring (roe) fisheries (Kresge et al. 197 4). 
However, local communities often do not receive the lion's share of 
the economic returns. Due to the capital requirements and the 
limited-entry permit system, few locals participate in the more 
Profitable fisheries and are often relegated to smaller, less-profitable 
ones. Studies have documented the trend of limited-entry permits 
transferring from rural Alaska to urban areas (Langdon 1987). Further, 
because the permits are limited in number, these fisheries fail to 
Provide new fishing jobs for the rapidly growing population. The 
salmon canneries and processing plants also provide some 
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However, local communities often do not receive the lion's share of 
the economic returns. Due to the capital requirements and the 
limited-entry permit system, few locals participate in the more 
profitable fisheries and are often relegated to smaller, less-profitable 
ones. Studies have documented the trend of limited-entry permits 
transferring from rural Alaska to urban areas (Langdon 1987). Further, 
because the permits are limited in number, these fisheries fail to 
provide new fishing jobs for the rapidly growing population. The 
salmon canneries and processing plants also provide some 
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employment, but wages are low, the work season is short, and 
nonresidents take many of these jobs as well. 
2.3 THE BERING SEA POLLOCK FISHERY 
In contrast to the isolated, rural poverty of the CDQ communities, 
ultra-modern catch-processor boats roam the Bering Sea, taking part 
in the largest fishery by tonnage in the world, the walleye pollack 
(Theragra chalcogramma) fishery. Passage of the Magnusson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act in 197 6 established a 200 mile 
wide area, now called an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), adjacent to 
US territorial waters. Among its many provisions, the act created 
eight regional councils to manage fishery policy within their confines. 
The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC) 
implemented its first plan in 1981 which set an optimum annual yield 
for bottomfish fisheries. Within that optimal range, the council 
decides upon an annual total allowable catch (TAC}. From 1981 to 
1987, the NPFMC permitted foreign vessels to catch that portion of 
the TAC not entirely harvested by the domestic fleet. With the 
domestic fleet continually expanding, they discontinued that 
practice, and the US-foreign joint fishery for pollack ended in 1990. 
Today, the pollack fishery annually totals nearly 2.9 billion pounds, or 
1.3 million metric tons, with a landed value exceeding $200 million. 
The large-volume, low-value harvest reaches, mostly foreign, 
consumers as frozen fillets, roe, and surimi. The fishery is managed on 
an open-access basis and divided into two seasons. The "A" roe 
season runs from January 1 to April 15 and comprises 45% of the non-
CDQ quota while the "B" non-roe season stretches from August 15 to 
December 31. Over-capitalization has ensured that the TAC is met in 
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a far shorter period of time than the allotted season. A moratorium on 
new vessel entry was established in 1995. 
By 1989 and 1990, over-capacity, disputes between inshore 
processors and the ocean-going catcher-processors, gear conflicts, 
bycatch problems, and marketing troubles led to a reassessment of 
the fishery. In response, the NPFMC instituted the above-mentioned 
seasonal allocations, roe-stripping limitations, and a host of other 
measures including an allocation between competing inshore and 
offshore processing interests. As a part of that allocation 
compromise, advocates for Western Alaska, including state officials, 
were able to gain support for the Western Alaska Community 
Development Quota Program (CDQ), approved in principal by the 
Secretary of the Department of Commerce in March 1992. The 
program has been added to since by the council and became 
enshrined in law in the summer of 1996. 
2.4 THE CDQ PROGRAM 
State and federal officials jointly administer the CDQ program. The 
federal government, in the form of the National Marine Fisheries 
Service and the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council, 
oversees fisheries issues, and the State of Alaska largely controls the 
economic-development portion of the program. Essentially, the state 
grants the resource to local development agencies, guides their 
efforts, and monitors their progress, all subject to final approval by the 
federal Secretary of the Department of Commerce. 
Table 2.2 lists the four basic criteria outlined by the State of Alaska for 
a community to qualify for the program. Provision 4 initially excluded 
Dutch Harbor and Akutan from participation, though citizens of 
Akutan gained access to the program in September 1995. 
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Table 2.2: CDQ Community Qualification Criteria 
1 Location within 50 nautical miles of the Bering Sea. 
2 'Native' village status as defined by AN CSA. 
3 Residents who conduct over 50% of their current 
subsistence and commercial fishing effort in the waters of 
the Bering Sea. 
4 No previously developed harvesting or processing 
capacity sufficient to support substantial groundfish 
fisheries particip ation. 
(adapted from State of Alaska 1995: 11) 
The first application procedure required likely communities to join 
together to form corporations. 
Table 2.3: CDQ Communities by Corporation 
APICDA Atka, False Pass, Nelson Lagoon, Nikolski, St. George. 
BBEDC Aleknagik, Clark's Point, Dillingham, Egegik, Ekuk, 
Manokotak, Naknek, King Salmon/Savonski, Pilot 
Point/Ugashik, Port Heiden, South Naknek, Togiak, 
and Twin Hills. 
CBSFA St. Paul. 
CVFC Cherfornak, Chevak, Eek, Goodnews Bay, Hooper Bay, 
Kipnuk, Konigianak, Kwigillingok, Mekoryuk, Newtok, 
Nightmute, Platinum, Quinhagak, Scammon Bay, Tooksok 
Bay, Tuntutuliak, and Tununak. 
NSEDC Brevig Mission, Diomede/lnalik, Elim, Gambell, Golovin, 
Koyuk, Nome, Savoonga, Shaktoolik, St. Michael, Stebbins, 
Teller, Unalakleet, Wales, and White Mountain. 
YDFDA Alakanuk, Emmonak, Kotlik, and Sheldon Point. 
(adapted from State of Alaska 1995: 11) 
In all, 56 communities have banded variously to create six 
corporations, shown in Table 2.3 with shareholder communities: 
Aleutian Pribilof Island Community Development Association 
(APICDA) for five communities; Bristol Bay Economic Development 
Corporation (BBEDC) for 13 communities; Central Bering Sea 
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Fishing Cooperative (CVFC) for 17 communities; Norton Sound 
Economic Development Corporation (NSEDC) for 15 communities; 
and Yukon Delta Fisheries Development Association (YDFDA) 
composed of 4 communities. These corporations received a total of 
7.5% of the TAC for pollock in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands district. 
With their share of this quota in hand, the corporations sought 
business partners to harvest their quota, bringing substantial revenue 
and employment to their communities. 
Five of the six organized as non-profit corporations, but some have 
for-profit subsidiaries. The sixth, Coastal Villages, is a for-profit 
corporation. Each corporation has contracted with established 
seafood companies to harvest and process their allocation. The five 
nonprofit corporations annually lease their quota in exchange for a 
combination of fixed, or base, price, percentage of net profit, and 
guarantee of employment for shareholders. Coastal Villages offered 
their allocation as their half of a joint venture and became co-owners 
of a catcher-processor. Because the CDQ can be fished at any time 
of year, including outside the non-CDQ seasons, it has additional 
value. Seafood companies are eager to extend their season and 
make their investments in equipment more profitable. 
Similar to the initial application procedure, the state reviews CDQ 
allocation proposals every two years. Table 2.4 lists the basic items 
necessary for a proposal. The State of Alaska has committed few of its 
preferences and guidelines to official policy and regulations. Instead, 
it prefers to give CDQ groups flexibility to pursue their particular goals 
within the larger goal of the program, "to provide the means for 
starting or supporting commerical seafood activities in Western 
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Alaska that will result in ongoing, regionally-based commercial 




Table 2.4: CDQ Proposal Requirements 
a request for a percentage of the CDQ reserve 
individual allocations shown in Table 2.5. 
goals and objectives concerning the development projects that 
will be undertaken. 
a business plan including employment creation, vocational and 
educational training, business and loan relationships, budget 
formulation, and related information to assure that the proposal 
is realistic. 
information about the managing organization that demonstrates 
an ability to manage a fishing operation and comply with 
re ulations. 
(adapted from Ginter 1995: 154) 
As both stick and carrot to ensure compliance, the state makes the 
recommendation for allocation of quota among the groups every 
two years, as shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: CDQ Pollock Allocations by Corporation 
Approved CDQ Allocations 1992/3 1994/5 1995/6 
APICDA 18% 18% 16% 
BBEDC 20% 20% 20% 
CBSFA 10% 8% 4% 
CVFC 27% 27% 25% 
NSEDC 20% 20% 22% 
YDFDA 5% 7% 13% 
{ adapted from Ginter 199 5: 154; Townsend 1996: 52) 
Given the regional differences, the CDQ corporations have stated 
and pursued differing goals, though all involve a mix of "investing, 
training, and infrastructure development" and are "aimed at 
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economies." (State of Alaska 1995: 14) Table 2.6 shows the stated 
development philosophies of the CDQ Corporations. 
Table 2.6 
CDQ Corporation Development Philosophies 
APICDA Create income and infrastructure generating 
business opportunities for the CDQ group in local 
communities and businesses. 
BBEDC Create an investment fund with which to invest in 
the seafood industry outside local, highly 
capitalized fisheries. 
CBSFA Use CDQ income to leverage local infrastructure 
development. 
CVFC Invest in ownership of offshore processor and use 
vertical integration and CDQ allocations to 
generate local employment. 
NSEDC Increase participation and profitability by 
residents in regional fisheries and invest in the 
seafood industry. 
YDFDA Train community residents as fishermen and 
finance vessel and gear loans and infrastructure 
development. 
(adapted from State of Alaska 1995: 15) 
In 1993, the NPFMC extended the CDQ program to halibut and 
sablefish in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands area, and the CDQ 
reservations for those species are determined by area. This 
amendment became effective in 1995 and occurred at the same 
time the NPFMC introduced Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) for 
the management of those fisheries. In the summer of 1995, the 
council announced that it would set aside 7.5% of all remaining Bering 
Sea fishery resources for CDQ groups. The reauthorization of the 
Magnusson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, passed by 
Congress in 1996, put these quota reservations into law, and set a 
starting date of 1998 for the addition of other species to the program, 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Greenland 
(source: Poole 1995: xvi) 
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Greenland is a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, but began assuming 
control over its domestic affairs in 1979. The tradition of Danish rule 
dates to the early 18th century when a Danish missionary, Hans Egede, 
journeyed to Greenland in a futile search for the remnants of earlier 
Norse settlements. Politically speaking, Greenland is divided into 
eighteen different kommunes, municipalities or regional 
administrative subdivisions, though three do not currently exist. 
Residents of twelve kommunes participate in the inshore shrimp 
fishery, from Nanortalik in the south, up the west coast to 
Qeqertarsuaq. However, most of the effort in the inshore fishery has 
traditionally centered on Disko Bay (Poole 1995). Therefore, these 
twelve municipalities, listed in Appendix Two, comprise the area of 
study in Greenland. 
3.1 NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE, AND RESOURCES 
3.1.1 GREENLAND 
Greenland, shown in Figure 3.1, is the world's largest island with a total 
area of 2, 1 75,600 km2 , 85% of which is covered by an inland ice sheet. 
The remaining ice-free 341,000 km2, a narrow belt of coastline, is 
indented with deep fjords and dotted by thousands of skerries and 
islands. Geologically part of the North American continent, 
Greenland is separated from Ellsemere Island by Nares Strait, a 
distance of only 25 km at its narrowest. The northern most point of 
Greenland, Cap Morris Jessup, at 83° 20' N, lies only 7 40 km from the 
North Pole, making it the most northerly point of land in the world. 
2,670 km to the south, Cap Farvel, at 59° 47' N, is its southernmost 
extent. At its widest, Greenland stretches 1,050 km from east to west 
(Statistics Greenland 1995: 23) . 
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While the climate is generally termed Arctic, the interplay of ocean 
currents, coastal features, and the inland icecap lead to 
considerable differences by region. Parts of southwest Greenland 
receive as much as a meter of precipitation annually, are relatively 
free of permafrost, and are mild enough to support modest 
agricultural efforts such as sheep farming. Temperatures in the far 
south range from a January mean of -15°C to a July mean of +8°C to 
+ 10°c. Northern areas can be quite harsh with mean temperatures of 
-30°C in January and +5°C in July and less than 20 cm of precipitation 
per year. 
The rugged, coastal, ice-free belt supports sparse plant life, typically a 
mix of Arctic and Alpine tundra including lichens, dwarf willow and 
birch, grasses, sedges, and heath-type and other flowering plants. In 
the south, scrub willow and alder might reach two to three meters in 
height, but no forests as such exist. Only six to eight species of land 
mammal inhabit the island. These include reindeer, musk oxen, Arctic 
hares, and the Arctic fox. Greenland is also home to approximately 50 
species of birds, more than half of which are migratory seabirds. 
While Greenland does have a long tradition of mining activity, mines 
have always been few in number, and no significant commercial 
mines operate today. Over the last century, cryolite mines at lvittuut 
yielded in excess of 3.5 million tons (Sch(2mwandt and Dawes 1992). 
Smaller and less important lead and zinc mines operated at 
Mestersvig and Marmorilik. Large coal deposits exist on Disko Island 
and were mined for some fifty years. Other known ore deposits, 
including iron, uranium, anorthosite, chromium, molybdenum, and 
tungsten exist, but so far have not proven significant enough to justify 
the costs of development (Lyck and Taagholt 1987). Oil and gas 
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surveys of the west Greenland continental shelf and North Greenland, 
conducted in the 1970s, did not lead to any development, but 
interest in these resources has returned in the 1990s. 
3.1.2 GREENLANDIC WATERS 
Because of pack ice, fast ice, and drifting icebergs, much of the 
coastline has open water for only a few months of the year (Hibler 
1987). The only year-round, ice-free coastline stretches from Sisimuit 
to Paamuit in southwest Greenland (Poole 1995). Fram Strait, off 
Greenland's east coast, is the major outlet for drifting Arctic Ocean 
pack ice, creating difficult shipping conditions and a cold local 
climate. However, this same current turns northward after rounding 
Cap Farvel and causes turbulence and mixing of nutrients in the water 
column, supporting a diversity of aquatic life (Lyck and Taagholt 
1987) . 
More than 200 species of fish, crustaceans, and mollusks live in 
Greenlandic waters; five to eight of these are commercially 
significant in modern times. Numerous marine mammals either live in 
or migrate through Greenlandic waters, including five species of 
seals, walrus, polar bears, and ten to fifteen different types of whales. 
As early as the 16th century, English and Dutch whalers sought their 
prey off Spitsbergen, just east of Greenland. When those stocks 
began to decline, whalers moved westward into Baffin Bay and the 
West Coast of Greenland. By the end of the 18th century, many 
Greenlanders caught seals for the fur trade as well as oil, and the cod 
fishery, which began modestly in 1911, rapidly expanded through the 
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3.2 PEOPLE 
3.2.1 PRE-HISTORY 
The earliest known inhabitants of Greenland arrived in north 
Greenland 4,500 to 4,000 years ago. These nomadic Paleo-eskimo 
groups likely followed and hunted land mammals such as muskox as 
their main prey. Successive groups, including the Thule who arrived 
about l ,000 years ago and are considered to be the ancestors of 
modern Greenlandic Inuit, hunted a mix of land and sea mammals 
with the later comprising a larger portion of their diet. 
Linguistically, genetically, and culturally, Greenlandic Inuit share much 
with Canadian and Alaskan (lnupiat) Inuit. Anthropologists and Inuit 
themselves consider residents of all three countries to be part of the 
same ethnic group. Within that framework, however, significant 
differences exist. For example, the three Greenlandic dialects, 
western, northern, and eastern, are mutually unintelligible and local 
identities are strong. 
As is often the case throughout the north, much of what we know 
today about pre-Christian spiritual beliefs comes from the missionaries 
that sought to destroy those beliefs. The Inuit world view consisted, 
and to some extent still consists, of an elaborate system of beliefs, 
taboos, and moral codes that regulated the behavior of Inuit towards 
animals and natural phenomena. This complex web of belief and 
practice, equipped the Inuit for a precarious and uncertain life. 
Accidents, illness, poor hunting, starvation, and bad weather all result 
from offending the spirits of animals or other natural forces. A shaman 
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Icelandic sagas and archaeological evidence tell of the Norse 
colonies in Greenland that lasted for some five hundred years, 
beginning in A. D. 985 (Sugden 1982). They subsisted largely by farming 
sheep and cattle and grew a few crops. When contact with Iceland 
and Europe stopped in the 15th Century, the Norse already knew of 
the skraelings, which translates as barbarians or Inuit. Reasons for the 
demise of the Norse settlements variously emphasize climatic 
change, disease, starvation, and direct or indirect competition with 
the Inuit (/bid.). 
3.2.2 HISTORY 
In 1721, Hans Egede, a Danish Lutheran missionary, journeyed to 
Greenland seeking to minister to the relic Norse colonies. Instead, he 
found only Inuit and began to convert them to Christianity while 
bartering trade goods for furs and oil. The Danish crown soon took 
control of the trading enterprise and, after the failure of several 
private interests, ran the monopolistic company well into this century. 
In contrast to the general pattern of Arctic colonization, the Danish 
colonial policy was strongly protectionist and paternalistic. They 
discouraged contact with outsiders and endeavored to maintain the 
traditional subsistence hunting lifestyle supplemented by the fur 
trade. Climatic changes reduced the number of seals and brought 
large schools of cod to Greenlandic waters in the early 20th century 
(Nuttall 1994) . . In response to this change the Danish government 
fostered the development of a commercial cod fishery, marking the 
only divergence from this policy until World War II (/bid.) . 
The occupation of Denmark by Germany stopped the flow of food, 
goods and money to Greenland. Combining strategic and 
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military bases in Greenland, imported goods for Greenlanders with the 
help of Canada, and exported cryolite to North America to produce 
aluminum for the war effort. These events brought tremendous 
change to Greenlandic society and highlighted the differences 
between their living standards and those of the developed world. 
Sensing that isolation had caused most of the social and economic 
problems in Greenland, Denmark changed its constitution in 1953, and 
Greenland became an integral part of the country, a northern county 
in effect. Along with the legal changes, the Danish government 
channelled a host of resources towards modernizing Greenland's 
economy, investing in infrastructure, social welfare, and a modern 
fishing and fish processing industry ( Poole 199 5). The government 
"encouraged" Greenlanders in outlying settlements to move to larger 
towns with open-water ports, and many young Greenlanders received 
formal education in Denmark. 
Concurrent with student counter-culture movements the world-over, 
those Greenlanders who had been educated in Europe, and exposed 
to the wider world, led a popular movement of people who wanted 
more independence from Denmark. In early 1975, Denmark 
established a formal Home Rule commission, composed of both 
Greenlanders and Danes, to investigate the situation and make 
recommendations for changing the legal relationship between 
Denmark and its former colony. Three years later, a Home Rule act 
passed the Danish parliament. After a popular referendum, the 
Greenland Home Rule Authority came into being in 1979, and 
Greenlanders began assuming control over most domestic affairs. 
Though still part of the Danish Realm, along with Denmark and the 
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Faroe Islands, Greenland formally withdrew from the European 
Economic Community, now the European Union, in 1985. 
3.2.3 PRESENT SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
The following figures, unless otherwise noted, all date to 1995 and 
have been taken from the Greenland Statistical Yearbook 1995/ 96 
(Statistics Greenland 1995). Greenland has a total population of 
55,000 to 56,000 inhabitants, approximately 7% of whom were born 
outside Greenland. Just over 80% of the population lives in the towns 
that are the seats of the country's fifteen kommunes, or 
municipalities. The remaining 20% live in 107 isolated settlements, 
including sheep farms and weather stations, that dot the coastline 
and fjords. The population of settlements has held steady since 1980. 
Nuuk, the capital and largest town with more than 12,000 residents, 
also contains the largest number of Greenlanders born outside the 
country, nearly 45% of its population. Three towns, Nuuk, Sisimuit, and 
llulissat, account for nearly half of the entire population. 
While the massive influx of public spending has largely continued 
since Home Rule was established, living conditions, particularly in 
smaller towns and settlements, do not often match those of the 
western world. Much of the available housing is crowded or 
substandard: 45% to 56% of Greenlanders indicated that cold or draft 
was a significant problem in their home. Further, only 70% of 
Greenlandic homes have inside running water for the entire year. 38% 
of homes have no lavatory and 44% have no telephone. 
Education levels remain fairly low as well. 20% of all Greenlanders did 
not complete their seven years of basic education. 47% of 
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have no vocational or higher education. Unlike many northern areas, 
the native language is not in danger of disappearing. Conversely, few 
Greenlanders describe themselves as bilingual (speaking both 
Greenlandic and Danish equally well), and many types of employment 
require the ability to speak Danish. 29% of town residents and 60% of 
settlement residents speak no Danish whatsoever. 
Travel between Greenlandic towns and settlements is both difficult 
and expensive. Most towns have airports at which fixed-winged 
aircraft land with some regularity, but due to the distances, weather 
conditions, and low number of paying passengers, costs are high. 
Many settlements are accessible only by boat or snowmachine. 
Health and social conditions reflect the isolation and quality of 
housing and health care available. While cancer rates are equal to 
those of western Europe, suicide accounted for 7% of pll deaths in 
1993. In that same year, accidents caused 6% of deaths and 
homicide a further 3%. 
3.2.4 PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
By any standard, the economy of Greenland is small, and the Home 
Rule Authority and other public entities employ the majority of 
Greenlanders ( 62%). The construction and manufacturing industries, 
together with traditional and commercial hunting and fishing, 
account for virtually all private jobs. However, this simple breakdown 
obscures exactly how limited the economy truly is. Most construction 
projects are for public buildings or housing or for some other quasi-
public concern. Further, the manufacturing sector mostly processes 
shrimp. In essence, the formal economy of Greenland has rested on 
the twin pillars of public spending and the shrimp industry for a 
decade (Poole 1995) . 
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Hunting and fishing in Greenland can be divided into four basic 
categories, though the lines between them are not always clear. 
These categories are: traditional or subsistence hunting and fishing, in 
which the catch is distributed among kin and community according 
to traditional patterns; informal commercial hunting and fishing in 
which the catch is sold at a stand by the local docks or outside a 
market; small scale-commercial fishing, ranging from ice-fishing for 
Greenlandic halibut, using dog teams to haul out the catch, to the 
inshore shrimp fishery; and offshore, large-scale commercial fishing, 
primarily for shrimp using multi-million dollar vessels and equipment. 
Traditional foods still comprise a large portion of the Greenlandic diet, 
even among those residing in large towns. 38% of Greenlanders 
residing in towns and 7 4% of those living in settlements report that 
they eat traditional foods at least three to four times a week if not 
more. In 1994, 3,100 Greenlanders, virtually all of them men, held 
licenses as professional or full-time hunter-fishers, and an additional 
4,100 held part-time hunter-fisher licenses. Unlike northern North 
America, traditional foods can be sold at informal markets, known as 
kalaaliminerniarfiit or kalaaliaraq ( Nuttall 1992: 147), providing cash to 
pay for the modern tools of the trade such as rifles and outboard 
motors. 
Given the few jobs available, it is no surprise that a relatively small, 
and generally Danish-speaking, elite, take a large share of the total 
income. In fact, the poorest 40% of Greenlanders only make 8% of the 
total national income. Figures from a forcoming article by Rasmus Ole 
Rasmussen (pers. comm.) indicate that income transfers, including but 
not limited to pensions, welfare, education, housing, and fur trade 
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subsidies, comprised roughly one fourth of taxable income in 1989-91 
in towns and settlements. Direct social welfare payments such as old-
age and disability pensions accounted for 20% of all public spending 
(Statistics Greenland 1995). 
3.3 THE OFFSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
As envisaged by Danish planners in the 1950s and 1960s, commercial 
fishing is Greenland's dominant industry. However, that industry is 
dominated in turn by exploitation of a single species, the deepwater 
prawn, also known as the northern shrimp (Pandus borealis) (Poole 
1995; Amason, R. and Friis, P. 1994). For most of this century, 
commercial fishing in Greenland focused on cod. By the mid-1970s, 
cod stocks dwindled. This change in abundance is generally related 
to a corresponding cooling of water temperature (Amason, R. and 
Friis, P. 1994: 189-190). In their absence, shrimp fishing rapidly 
expanded. In 1994, a total of 58,355 tons of shrimp and fish (43,815 
shrimp, 1,786 cod, and 12,611 Greenland halibut) were landed in 
Greenlandic waters for onshore processing, and a nearly equal 
amount was exported directly. The value of the shrimp and fish 
processed onshore totaled 424 million Danish kroner, about £42 million 
or $68.5 million U.S., in that year. 
Based on the strength of the industry, Royal Greenland, the successor 
to the Danish colonial trading monopoly and now a public 
corporation owned by the Home Rule Authority, employs over 3,000 
people world-wide (Statistics Greenland 1995) and is one of the 
world's largest fishing enterprises (Royal Greenland News 1991 ). The 
Greenlandic offshore shrimp fleet consisted of 46 vessels in 1991, 
eight owned directly by Royal Greenland. European Union member 
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annual direct payment to the Home Rule Authority. Of the 46 vessels 
in the Greenlandic offshore fleet, all are at least 79 Gross Registered 
Tons (GRT) and highly modernized. At least 20 of the vessels are 
catcher-processors which process the shrimp on board and deliver a 
near market-ready product (Poole 1995: 40-45). 
Greenland did not enjoy full jurisdiction over its fisheries until 1985, 
when it formally withdrew from the European Union, then known as the 
European Economic Community. Two years before the enactment of 
home rule, Denmark first asserted a 200 nautical mile fishing zone 
baseline, south of 75° N off the west coast and 67°N off the east 
coast. Three years later, the Home Rule Authority extended the zone 
around the entirety of its coastline, following a midline when the 
distance to a neighbor was less than 400 nautical miles (Poole 1995). 
Currently, the Greenland Home Rule Authority establishes a TAC for 
most of its home waters based on advice from the North Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the International Commission for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) for their respective subdivisions. 
Since 1991, the offshore fishery has been managed by an individual 
transferable quota (ITQ) system of privatized ownership. 
3.4 THE INSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
The inshore fishing fleet is the economic mainstay of Greenland's 
coastal settlements and small towns, and shrimp is the most important 
marine resource in Greenlandic waters (Amason, R. and P. Friis 1994). 
Local Greenlandic fisherman have exploited inshore shrimp stocks, at 
least in the vicinity of Disko Bay, since before World War II, making it 
one of the older fisheries in the country. From the 1950s to the mid-
1980s, fleet capacity and catch held fairly steady, and landings 
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boom in the offshore fishery, the early to mid- l 980s, the inshore fleet 
grew as well. In 1987, concern over the future of inshore shrimp stocks 
led the Home Rule Authority to regulate fishing capacity. The initial 
attempt was simple, but management regimes have steadily evolved 
over the past decade. 
As of November 1987, new entrants into the inshore fishery had to 
obtain a license which could only be granted when a vessel, or 
vessels, of equal capacity left the fishery. In spite of this control, total 
catch in the fishery rose to 24,701 tons in 1992. Until 1989, vessels 
registered in ports south of 68°N could not fish north of this limit, 
dividing the west coast into two regional fisheries. Though several 
factors are likely to prevent a total collapse in inshore stocks, such as 
recruitment from offshore stocks, ice conditions which limit the fishing 
season for much of the year north of Sisimuit, and substantial areas of 
untrawlable seabed, yields per trawl time decreased throughout the 
first half of the decade. 
Responding to the need, a new attempt to regulate fishery capacity 
became effective on November 21, 1991. This market-based system 
incorporates some elements of a classic ITQ system but is based upon 
fishing capacity not effort. Table 3.1 summarizes the main points of 
the capacity-points system. 
Table 3.1: Main Features of the Capacity-Points System 
a All vessels participating in the fishery must have a valid license. 
b Licenses do not need to be renewed. 
c All vessels for which a license was held as of 1 st December 1991 
were assigned a specific number of vessel points according to 
average catches over the period 1987-90 (or from the year of 
entry onwards if a vessel entered the fishery after 1987). One 
vessel point was awarded where average catches fell below 
50 tons, two vessel points were awarded where average 
catches lay between 50 and 100 tons and so on. 
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d All vessels for which a new license is sought are to be assigned a 
certain number of vessel points corresponding to estimated 
fishing capacity arrived at from information supplied to the 
GHRA on length, width, hold capacity, provisions for 
accommodation, year built, and winch and motor horsepower. 
The number of vessel points assigned to the vessels concerned is 
fixed in accordance with the scale specified above. 
e Cases where extensions, modifications or repairs to vessels 
increase fishing capacity are to be accorded a revised number 
of vessel points in a similar fashion to that described in point (d). 
f Those individuals, groups of individuals or companies in 
possession of a valid license as of 1 st December 1991 (but not 
those who made landings only in 1987 and landed less than 100 
tons in this particular year) were awarded a number of owner 
points equaling the number of vessel points allocated under 
point (c). 
g Owner points are marketable, but speculation and leasing is 
prohibited. 
h The GHRA shall be informed of all transactions involving owner 
points. 
The local authorities cannot buy or sell owner points. 
j Owner points can be inherited. 
k For a license to be valid, the number of owner points a party 
holds must at least match the number of vessel points 
possessed. 
The GHRA is able to increase or decrease the maximum total 
fishing capacity that can be employed in the fishery by 
changing the number of owner points required before new 
licenses can be granted to prospective entrants. This is 
accomplished by increasing or decreasing the value of a single 
vessel point expressed in terms of tons fishing capacity. Such a 
change applies only to vessels for which a new license is sought. 
(adapted from Poole 1996: 360-1) 
Poole (Ibid.) outlines four main objectives for the capacity system: 
reduction of administrative burden, regulation of total fishery 
capacity, dynamic fleet development, and encouragement of 
inefficient fishers to be replaced by more efficient ones. This 
capacity-points system operated until November 1, 1996 when the 
GHRA adopted an ITQ system for the inshore fleet. 
Today, the inshore fishery plays a crucial role in the economy of 
Greenland, but most of its participants rarely, if ever, record a profit. 
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approximately two-thirds of the shrimp processed onshore by Royal 
Greenland (Ibid. 1995: 172). In fact, inshore vessels cannot legally sell 
to another buyer. All told, the inshore vessels employ somewhere 
above 750 crew members and skippers and create the equivalent of 
300-350 full-time processing jobs (Ibid.). However, despite legal 
attempts to rationalize the fishery, the overwhelming majority of 
inshore vessels perform poorly and do not realize a profit. 
Due in part to old and inefficient equipment and vessels, catches are 
small. Between 1987 and 1989, just 27 vessels caught 50% of the total 
volume of shrimp for those years. Conversely, the bottom third of 
vessels averaged landings of less than 50 tons per year during that 
time. Not surprisingly, 90% of inshore vessel owners remain in arrears 
on vessel and equipment loans even with the generous terms 
provided by the public loan agency (Ibid.). Because of the lack of 
alternative employment, most unprofitable fishermen have few 
incentives to leave the fishery. Recognizing the economic situation 
of loan holders and potential political troubles, government seizures 
of vessels and assets for nonpayment of loans are extremely rare. In 
sum, the GHRA faces a dilemma. Conservation of the shrimp stocks 
and rational use of labor and capital, the two standard fishery 
management objectives, require a reduction in the number of vessels 
in the fishery. Unfortunately, reducing the number of vessels will only 
increase unemployment for those with few alternatives. 
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The most logical reason for development in Western Alaska's coastal 
villages and the settlements of Greenland to focus on fishery 
resources is that they are available; they exist to be exploited and are 
renewable. As indicated in the prior two chapters, land-based 
resources are in short supply and the history of each area reflects this, 
with long traditions of marine resource utilization. However, the 
simple criteria of availability is only one of a number of factors which 
will affect the success of a program designed to overcome 
"obstacles to desired forms of change," both social and economic. 
This chapter reviews and highlights elements of five works that each 
deal with development in remote regions from different vantage 
points. Because several of these texts are quite large, the review 
focuses specifically on ideas crucial for the building of a successful 
development program. It then identifies common elements from the 
different works to develop evaluation criteria for the two regimes 
under scrutiny. 
4.1 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE AND MODELS 
4.1.1 BERMAN'S 'STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE' 
In a short paper, Berman ( 1986) sought to discover what types of 
economic activities hold the most potential for the economic self-
reliance of rural northern communities. Importantly, his goal was the 
self-reliance of these communities, not just wage-job creation. In 
other words, while he focused on activities that take place within the 
scope of traditional economics, such as wage-earning jobs, he did not 
neglect to account for their impact on activities customarily outside 
the view of economists, such as subsistence hunting and gathering. 
He rightly notes that "indiscriminate efforts to promote employment 
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and income growth may do more harm in terms of unrealistic 
expectations and social disruption than good." (Ibid. 1986: 2) 
He reviewed economic enterprises based on three basic criteria: 
technical suitability, comparative advantage, and economic 
feasibility. For Berman, technical suitability included two important 
factors. First, small groups or households must be able to successfully 
carry out the activity. Second, the activity cannot damage or inhibit 
hunting and fishing activities unless it offers enough permanent 
income to reduce the necessity of hunting and fishing for survival. 
Comparative advantage means the technically suitable activities in 
which the "combination of cash income and noncash benefits" meets 
with participants' preferences. Finally, economic feasibility requires 
that the activity yields sufficient income for some community 
members or households to prefer the activity to the combination of 
transfer income and more leisure time. 
Guided by these three ideas, Berman found that hunting, trapping, 
and fishing activities represent the best hope for rural northerners to 
achieve self-sufficiency. Most northern communities have been 
centered on a sufficient natural-resource base for hunting, fishing, and 
trapping since pre-contact times. Further, commercial and 
subsistence activities based on those resources take place side by 
side and use many of the same tools and methods of production. The 
remainder of Berman's paper examines income potential from each 
of these activities in different regions of Alaska and suggests how it 
may be improved, focusing on specific ways to increase control over 
and access to resources for Native Alaskans. 
46 
·/, 
Chapter Four: Literature Review and Criteria Development 
4.1.2 LANGDON'S SUITABILITY CRITERIA 
In an article published in 1987, Steve Langdon addressed the issue of 
the suitability of commercial fisheries in Western Alaska as a 
development opportunity for Alaska Natives. In doing so, he 
developed his own criteria, but they echo several themes found 
elsewhere in the literature. He found four primary reasons to support 
the idea: 
l . "it builds on technical skills and environmental knowledge 
congruent with subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering 
activities learned as part of growing up in the village. 
2. it is seasonal. allowing for subsistence activities. 
3. the work organization of commercial fisheries follows the 
domestic mode of production which organizes subsistence 
production. 
4. it is egalitarian and maximizes opportunities for autonomy 
and independent decision making, minimizing hierarchical 
relationships between persons." (Ibid. 1987: 22-3) 
It should be noted that he focused on the salmon and herring fisheries 
of the area, not bottomfish, and that this article was published five 
years before the CDQ program came into being. Overall, his 
arguments and conclusions show that state policy had neglected to 
fully exploit this opportunity for Native development, instead allowing 
many of the benefits to accrue to fishermen from urban Alaska and 
\ 
farther afield. The "work production" in Langdon's model refers to 
summer fish camps, a feature absent in both programs being 
examined. These fish camps are located near the mouths of rivers 
and have been used by families to harvest salmon since traditional 
times. Because both pollock and shrimp are nontraditional species 
and are not caught in such a manner, this does not apply. 
4.1.3 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The publication of Our Common Future by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development ( 1987: 43) pushed the already 
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popular idea of sustainable development, which it defined as 
"meet[ing] the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs," to the forefront of the 
world's imagination. Seizing this concept, many have attempted to 
incorporate notions of sustainability into their planning and policy 
making. In practice it has proved difficult, and some suggest that 
sustainable development is an oxymoron (Flanders 1992). Returning 
to the case at hand, the two fishing regimes pass the test at first 
glance. Fish are a renewable resource, and the regimes in place 
manage on a maximum sustained yield basis. However, more 
complete models of sustainable development set a higher standard. 
Barbier ( 1987) explained his view of sustainable development with a 
fairly simple but useful model. It consists of three main parts: the 
biological and resource system, the economic system, and the social 
system. According to the model, shown in Figure 4.1, sustainable 
development occurs in the area in which the three systems overlap, 
that is, when it incorporates all three systems. 









(adapted from Barbier 1987: 104) 
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Several restraints keep the model from being more precise. First, it 
must consider both quantitative elements, such as employment, and 
more qualitative ones, such as social cohesion and stability. Also, 
development is a dynamic process, and, as such, participants must 
constantly measure trade-offs such as increased production versus 
environmental degradation. Likewise, as social, economic, and 
environmental considerations vary by region so do local priorities. 
However, despite its limitations, the conceptual model forces users to 
consider other aspects and consequences of development besides 
the economic ones. 
Young (1995) took this model and applied it to development 
opportunities available to indigenous people in Australia and 
Canada, placing activities within their appropriate spheres. 
Figure 4.2: The Sustainable Development Model 
Applied to Subsistence Hunflng and Gathering, Mining, 
and Trapping and Pastoralism 
Subsistence 
Hunting and Gathering 
Mining Trapping and Pastoralism 
(adapted from Young 1995: 264) 
Figure 4.2 shows his placement of three types of activities. For 
example, mining development includes economic aspects which, 
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However, despite its limitations, the conceptual model forces users to 
consider other aspects and consequences of development besides 
the economic ones. 
Young (1995) took this model and applied it to development 
opportunities available to indigenous people in Australia and 
Canada, placing activities within their appropriate spheres. 
Figure 4.2: The Sustainable Development Model 
Applied to Subsistence Hunting and Gathering, Mining, 
and Trapping and Pastoralism 
Subsistence 
Hunting and Gathering 
Mining Trapping and Pastoralism 
(adapted from Young 1995: 264) 
Figure 4.2 shows his placement of three types of activities. For 
example, mining development includes economic aspects which, 
when governed by strict environmental-impact regulations, can 
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extend into the environmental/resource sphere as well. While a few 
companies have experimented with work schedules that allow for 
traditional social structures and subsistence pursuits, these are the 
exception that prove the rule, and, thus, Young does not show mining 
as falling into the social category. As seen in the Figure 4.2, 
subsistence hunting and gathering incorporates all three elements: 
social, through sharing of catch; environmental by its fundamental 
reliance on natural resources; and the economic, both monetary, for 
equipment and transportation, and non-monetary, for providing food 
and products for household consumption. 
Of the activities discussed by Young, trapping and pastoralism offer 
the closest parallel to commercial fishing. Small-scale efforts aimed 
at providing for local needs fall within all three areas of concern. 
Efforts directed towards commercial markets and export move into 
the area in which only the economic and environmental spheres 
overlap. Essentially, the model indicates a spectrum of activity, and 
any given enterprise may have a foot in both the social, and thus 
sustainable, and non-social camps. 
At the close of his treatise on aboriginal development, Young (1995: 
272) outlines six fundamental components of a practical approach to 
sustainable development for indigenous people of remote regions: 
1 . "acknowledgment of the need for aboriginal control over 
development both at national and regional levels and also 
at community levels; 
2. recognition of the social and economic diversity of 
aboriginal communities, and of how this affects their 
responses to development opportunities; 
3. negotiation (a step beyond consultation) to ensure both 
that the development is following an appropriate path, 
and that those concerned get their fair share of the benefits 
flowing from it; 
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4. deliberate fostering of aboriginal skills to enhance their 
chances of more equal participation in development 
affecting them; 
5. creation of an aboriginal resource base, over which they 
exert control in ways which allow them to determine how 
these resources might be used for development. 
6. provision of adequate and appropriate forms of financial 
backing so that aboriginal groups and individuals can offer 
the capital needed to carry out their plans." 
Having examined subsistence, tourism, mining, and community stores, 
Young gleaned these ideas from the successes and failures of those 
enterprises in the remote regions of Canada and Australia. 
4.1.4 INFORMAL -VS- FORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Ross and Usher ( 1986) suggest a somewhat different way of looking at 
economic activities and development. Largely intended as a 
critique of mainstream Canadian and American industrial economies, 
their work emphasizes the importance of the informal economy, much 
neglected by current economic thought and policy in their view. 
They define the "essence" of the informal economy as "a democratic 
collective involvement, where decision making in economic 
organizations is directly responsible to the households and 
communities that support them and depend on them." (Ibid. : 129) 
They stress the fact that while formalized industry has brought a wider 
range of products to the market, "it is less evident that personal 
satisfaction is derived from industrially produced goods and services." 
(Ibid. : 54) To their way of thinking, because we have not attached 
an economic value to the "social fabric," modern economic policy 
ignores it and subsequent damage done to it by the formal, industrial 
economy. 
To provide a model of a community that relies upon and values a 
higher level of informal economic activity, Ross and Usher describe 
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the village economy of the indigenous people living in remote 
regions of Canada. This small-scale subsistence lifestyle, in which 
extended households and local communities rely on each other to 
provide goods and services, typifies informal economic activity. All is 
not well in the village economy, however, despite its high reliance on 
informal economic activity. A simple glance at the economic 
conditions in Chapter Two and Three of this thesis reveal the lack of 
wage jobs and basic industry in the two study areas selected, and 
remote regions in general. Ross and Usher state it simply, "the village 
economy in recent years has suffered a chronic shortage of cash." 
(/bid. : 144). This lack of capital leads to another serious problem, 
vulnerability to "events and decisions" beyond the "knowledge and 
control" of the village (Ibid.: 148) . 
They list six factors or characteristics that, when viewed as whole, 
distinguish formal from informal activity, shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of Formal Economic Activity 
1 isolation of production and consumption roles 
2 use of contracts 
3 effects of a competitive environment 
4 results of specialized economic roles 
(and the deskilling that results) 
5 use of hierarchical and authoritative 
organizational structures 
6 constant pursuit of modernization and growth 
( adapted from Ross and Usher 1986: 21) 
Formal activities are not altogether bad, though. The village 
economy necessarily includes a formal, or wage, element. Ross and 
Usher state this point succinctly, " It must be kept in mind that much 
informal activity can flourish only if some cash flow and material 
support is available to sustain it in a healthy state." (Ibid. : 121) For 
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remote regions, then, the crucial question is: does an activity provide 
adequate cash input for the informal economy while avoiding serious 
damage to it? 
4.2 CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the different viewpoints, several common themes emerge in 
the highlights above. Chief among them is the issue of control which 
extends to all areas of a development enterprise. By the working 
definition of this thesis, remote regions lack autonomy, both political 
and economical. Berman implied the lack of control that northern 
communities have over their fates in his title, "Strategies for 
Economic Self-Reliance in Northern Villages." In Barbier's model, the 
constant need for evaluating the trade-offs between the three 
spheres of activity calls for local control to ensure the balance suits 
local desires at any given time. Ross and Usher argue that it is 
indigenous people themselves who should define the proper balance 
between formal and informal economies. The need for local control is 
also echoed in their statement that the village economy is 
"increasingly vulnerable to events and concerns beyond its 
knowledge and control. (Ibid.: 148) Young directly confronts the issue 
as well. Two of his six components of practical approach to 
development use the words "aboriginal control" and several more 
reinforce the idea. 
If the ability of northern communities to exercise control over their 
own lives is to be meaningful, it must include control over a 
substantial resource base. As identified by Berman, successful 
development depends on adequate resources, generally renewable 
resources such as fish and game. The conclusion of Langdon's article 
is that the state had effectively excluded Alaska Natives from a 
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logical and feasible development opportunity by limiting their access 
to local fishery resources. In his long list, Young addresses this issue as 
well. He notes the need for "creation of an aboriginal resource base, 
over which they exert control.. .. " (Young 199 5: 272). Closely 
associated with the idea of a resource base, northern communities 
must also possess, or have access to, the capital to "carry out their 
plans" for those resources, as noted by Young (Ibid.). Ross and Usher 
stress this crucial point by noting the inability of northern communities 
to save cash and link this fact to their fundamental dependence on 
outside forces and actors. 
Obviously development must create jobs, and the number of jobs will 
be outlined in Chapter Five. However, the nature of those jobs is 
critically important for northern communities. The social organization 
of both the enterprise and the method of production must closely 
align with local values or few participants will elect to take part in 
them. Two of Berman's terms, technical suitability and comparative 
advantage illustrate this point. If development does not yield the 
"combination of cash income and noncash benefits" preferred by 
community members, it is not an attractive alternative (Berman 1986: 
5). Similarly, the work production itself should not conflict with 
traditional structures. Langdon ( 1987: 22-3) echoes this concern, 
emphasizing appropriate "work organization" and "minimizing 
hierarchical relationships." Concerns about the social aspects of 
economic activity also lie at the heart of Ross and Usher's celebration 
of the informal economy. 
The social organization of work activity and structures is linked with 
the question of time. Among the advantages Langdon lists for 
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pursuits during the remainder of the year. In describing the competing 
yet linked formal and informal economies, Ross and Usher accent the 
competition for labor, or time. They underscore this idea by adding 
that, "wage income is not always an addition to net income." (Ross 
and Usher 1986: 148) In other words, "losses from the traditional 
sector would have to made up by substantially greater amounts of 
wage income to provide purchasing power, quite apart from social 
considerations." (Ibid.} 
Another issue related to the organization of work activities is the 
possession or acquisition of sufficient skills by indigenous people in 
order to take advantage of development that does occur. Three of 
the authors address this criterion. Berman uses the term technical 
suitability to characterize activities in which northern communities 
can participate. Langdon notes that commercial fishing builds on 
existing skills, and Young calls for the opportunity to develop new skills 
as needed to enjoy the full benefits of development projects. 
Finally, though not mentioned by any of the authors examined in this 
chapter, this thesis adds another criterion to the assessment process. 
Because of the integral role of government in the two programs under 
scrutiny, their long-term political viability is vitally important. Issues 
such as control over and access to public resources constitute one of 
the essential roles of government. They involve questions of social 
equity and are often highly divisive, placing interest groups in 
adversarial positions. Therefore, development programs must have 
sufficient public support or they will not last long enough to assist 
indigenous people of remote, northern regions to "overcome 
obstacles to desired forms of change." 
55 
Chapter Four: Literature Review and Criteria Development 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
A survey of relevant development literature reveals several common 
threads for the weaving of a successful development program. The 
central issue is control. Indigenous participants must be able to 
ensure that development incorporates local concerns and meets 
local needs. Furthermore, control is meaningless if participants do not 
have adequate resources and capital with which to create viable 
enterprises. The social organization of development enterprises, both 
in their management structure and method of production must 
embrace indigenous beliefs and patterns of behavior, otherwise they 
will destroy the unique social fabric they have been created to 
maintain. Two important subsets of appropriate social organization 
are time and the fostering of skills. Remembering the high level of 
informal economy both preferred and required in the village 
economy, development activities must allow time for these pursuits. 
The enterprises must also rely on existing skills and foster new ones 
when necessary and desired, if indigenous people are to be able to 
fully participate in them. Finally, because the two programs being 
examined in this thesis are sponsored by government, their long-term 
political viability is crucial to their success. 
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5.1 CONTROL 
Debates about development often center on the issue of control. 
However, the issue of control is difficult to discuss in isolation. 
Because "control" logically implies control over something, the issue 
pervades the entire chapter. As a result, this section primarily 
discusses the influences of governments and markets on resources 
that the inhabitants of the CDQ region and the participants in the 
inshore fishery nominally control. 
Much of modern development literature critiques the "top down" 
approaches of the past and suggests transferring greater property 
rights, to both land and natural resources, to indigenous groups as a 
first step to self-sufficiency (Huskey and Morehouse 1992). Young 
( 1995: 8) identifies this as "what many people would see as the prime 
challenge of development." As noted in Chapters Two and Three, the 
transfer of control over resources has happened at the macro-level 
to varying degrees in both Alaska and Greenland. On a more local 
scale, both the CDQ program and the capacity-points system of the 
inshore fishery invest indigenous people with some control over fishery 
resources. 
The issue is not so straightforward, however. Simple legal control over 
resources is not enough to dictate the pace and character of 
development. In both cases at hand, the fishery focuses on a species 
not harvested in traditional times and production is ultimately geared 
for export to foreign markets. Basic economics tells us that resource 
production takes place when the market price at least covers the 
costs of production and transportation, and resource prices are 
"notoriously" cyclical (Huskey and Morehouse 1992: 131). The slump in 
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1992 clearly illustrate this dependence on the forces of distant 
markets. However, the paucity of other available resources give 
these people few options, and the same market influences govern all 
resource development in remote regions and, indeed, anywhere in 
the world. 
In addition to market forces, other factors affect development of 
resources that indigenous people nominally control. Government 
decisions about development, based on those resources, also 
highlight concerns about local autonomy. First and foremost, the 
CDQ program is a government program, administered by both state 
and federal agencies, so control over development ultimately rests 
with those officials. However, the Alaskan state government, in its 
development role, has not employed a "one size fits all" approach. 
The state encourages CDQ corporations to exercise a fair amount of 
local control, as seen in the various 11development philosophies" in 
Table 2.6, and to tailor operations to suit local needs. This is 
facilitated by the use of informal communication channels and the 
absence of the highly detailed regulations normally associated with 
government grant-type programs (Townsend 1996). 
In its report to the NPFMC on the 1996-98 allocation decisions, the 
State of Alaska listed its most detailed CDQ policy. It named four 
primary criteria for evaluating CDQ corporations: 11 past compliance, 
past performance, need, and 'merit of proposal for future'." (qtd. in 
Ibid.) Several examples of changes in allocations illustrate this policy. 
As shown in Table 2.3, Central Bering Sea had its pollock quota 
allocation reduced twice, from 10% to 8% and then again to 4% of the 
total available CDQ, because of compliance concerns (Townsend 
1996). The state's most direct intervention in the workings of 
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corporations to date involves Coastal Villages. Concerned over a 
"disappointing contract with their harvesting partner," the state split 
the Coastal Villages pollack allocation for 1996-98 (qtd. in Ibid.: 14). 
It gave 18% to lmarpiqamuit Partnership, Coastal Villages' harvesting 
joint venture which had enjoyed the full quota until that time, and the 
remaining 7% went to a new and small Coastal Villages nonprofit 
investment fund which could then lease the quota to another 
company. In sum, the state rewards corporations that perform to 
certain standards by the quota allocation process and punishes those 
that do not, but it clearly expects some innovation as well. The state 
has generally avoided direct involvement with the workings of CDQ 
corporations but intervened when it felt it was necessary. 
The decision by state officials to limit investments to fisheries-related 
activities demonstrates a potentially damaging exercise of control 
(/bid.). The State of Alaska has always resented vessels from the 
"lower 48," particularly Washington and Oregon, catching a large 
share of resources from Alaskan waters. For instance, these issues 
arose during the debate over Alaska's statehood in the late 1950s. 
Many of the fisheries in the Bering Sea region are already fully 
exploited and over-capitalized. Further investment by CDQ groups in 
fisheries activities must "either buy out existing capacity or result in 
over-capitalization." (/bid.: 39) Competition between fishers 
sponsored by Yukon Delta and Norton Sound over the small Norton 
Sound crab fishery, and the resulting build up of overcapacity, has 
already led the NPFMC to implement a new limited-entry system. So 
far, Bristol Bay, whose region hosts the intensively-capitalized and 
highly-valued salmon fisheries, has at least paid lip-service to 
avoiding over-capacity in its development plans, but it remains a 
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capitalization is exacerbated by the nature of the seafood industry. In 
his review of ANCSA regional corporations, Colt ( 1991: 3) noted that 
seafood-processing investments were some of the worst performing 
investments made. 
In Greenland, because the inshore fishery involves more than just a 
single program, the controlling influence of the GHRA is more difficult 
to discuss. The management structure of the fishery itself is 
technically under "aboriginal control," as is the rest of the GHRA, and 
KNAPK, the small fishermans' union does assert itself. However, inshore 
shrimp fishermen are not the most powerful interest group lobbying 
the Landsting, the parliament of Greenland. On fishing issues, the 
sheer economic strength of Royal Greenland and the offshore 
trawlers, both foreign and Greenlandic, exert a powerful influence on 
fisheries policy. In the inshore fishery, fishermen have some control 
over how they catch their shrimp, i.e. who they choose as crew and 
what sort of hours they work, but once they land the shrimp, their 
options narrow dramatically. Shrimp from the inshore fishery must be 
sold to local Royal Greenland plants (Friis, P. pers. comm.}. 
5.2 RESOURCES AND CAPITAL 
5.2.1 RESOURCE BASE OF THE CDQ PROGRAM 
The design of the CDQ program reflects the long struggle by rural, 
Native Alaskans to participate in commercial fisheries. The limited-
entry program, enacted in 1973 and implemented in the Bering Sea in 
1975-7 6, typifies this struggle. Briefly, a limited-entry permit system 
establishes a set number of fishers in a fishery, identified by the type of 
gear as well as by area. Then, permits are distributed, generally based 
on prior participation in the fishery, to fishermen. Thereafter, no one 
can enter the fishery without a permit, which can be bought and sold 
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similar to other property rights. Once the system began in Alaska, 
permits began to flow out of rural areas. For poor performers in the 
fishery, the economically rational act was to sell the permit which was 
be valued on average catches that were higher than their own. In 
general the poorer performers were, and still are, Alaska Natives 
because they lacked capital and had not participated in the fishery 
as long as outsiders. Further, linguistic and bureaucratic difficulties 
often prevented them from taking advantage of state loan programs 
to upgrade their equipment. Permit ownership by rural Alaskans 
dropped by 9 .5% in the first seven years that system operated 
(Langdon 1987: 18). Attempts by the state government to turn the 
tide, mainly through a special loan program, were largely ineffective 
and the trend has continued. 
Another difficulty with the limited-entry system also tempered the 
structure of the CDQ program. The limited-entry law took effect 
before a large generation of youth born in Western Alaskan villages 
reached adulthood (Ibid.: 15). When they did, the permits had 
already been granted, and they had few alternatives. Several of this 
generation chose to work for a relative in the hopes of inheriting a 
permit, but obviously that route was not available to all. Moreover, 
without any significant capital reserves, the purchase of permits from 
nonlocals remains virtually impossible. 
With this experience in mind, the CDQ program invests Alaska Natives 
with a different type of right to fishery resources. The program 
allocates a percentage of the TAC for pollack, halibut, and sablefish 
in the Bering Sea region to communities, instead of to individuals. 
Therefore, the community retains the right to catch a certain amount 
of fish for the life of the program, subject to allocation decisions by 
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the state. The communities can lease their quotas for up to two years, 
the length of the state's allocation period, but they cannot sell the 
fundamental right to the resource. It is inalienable from the 
community. 
By any measure, the value of the CDQ allocations is significant. 7.5% 
of the TAC for Bering Sea/ Aleutian Islands 9rea pollack has averaged 
about 100,000 tons annually since 1992. Using a mean weighted value 
for landed pollack of $200/ton, that equals $20 million (Townsend 
1996: 19). Moreover, due to the special features of the CDQ, 
corporations have been able to obtain lease values that reflect 
virtually all of the landed price (Ibid.). Because the CDQ can be 
fished outside the normal pollack seasons, it prolongs use of vessels 
and processing equipment, making investments in these areas more 
efficient. It also allows companies to "tune up" their crew and 
operations for the intense Olympic pollack seasons and produce a 
fresh product for the market for a longer period of time. 
The NPFMC introduced CDQs for halibut and sablefish in 1995. The 
sablefish quotas engender few returns for CDQ corporations because 
of their size. Residents of western Alaska have not traditionally 
targeted sablefish so leases similar to those for the pollack quota 
would appear to be an appropriate mechanism for CDQ corporations 
to utilize their quota. Unfortunately, finding a market for such small 
quotas has been a difficult task (Townsend 1996). 
The value of the halibut allocations vary dramatically by region, due 
in large part to the availability of species. In some areas it is 
substantial. In others, returns barely cover the cost of the required 
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inshore vessels, all CDQ groups distribute their quota among local 
fishers, creating local Olympic fisheries. The village of Atka, in the 
form of the Atka Fisherman's Association, a subsidiary of APICDA, 
received a quota equaling 462,000 pounds. Accordingly, APICDA 
plans to invest some earnings from its pollack lease to further local 
harvesting and processing. With local processing facilities operating, 
the value of Atka's quota should lie somewhere between $700,000 
and $900,000 annually (Ibid.). Such a fishery could transform the 
economy of this village of approximately 100 people. On the other 
hand, the quotas allocated to Bristol Bay and Coastal Villages 
accounted for "little more than administrative nuisances" for both 
groups (Ibid.: 23). 
5.2.2 CAPITAL IN THE CDQ PROGRAM 
Because of the value of pollack CDQ rents, the capital base and the 
resource base in the CDQ program are one and the same. The state 
and federal governments appropriate no further public funds, other 
than administrative costs, towards the program. As indicated above, 
the pollack rents are substantial, and profits have financed a host of 
vessels, permits, and infrastructure development such as processing 
plants that add value to local catch. 
The different philosophies of each corporation, illustrated in Table 2.4, 
have resulted in distinct routes to development. Yukon Delta 
Fisheries Development Association has financed the construction of a 
distant-water, small-boat fleet. Targeting species outside their local 
area, the multi-purpose vessels fish for halibut and groundfish off the 
Aleutian Islands, crab in Norton Sound, and salmon and herring in both 
the Norton Sound and the Yukon Delta regions. Coastal Villages 
concentrate their efforts on two joint-venture projects: a catcher-
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processor vessel that targets pollock and a salmon-buying and 
processing operation aboard the Lucky Buck (Ibid. : 31 ). Central 
Bering Sea concentrated on building large-scale port infrastructure to 
attract fishing activity to the area. Questions about the possibility of 
attracting development led Central Bering Sea to change strategies 
in its most recent development plan. 
Norton Sound, along with its fishing partner Glacier Fish, launched the 
most successful CDQ development venture in 1994 {/bid.). As the 
northernmost CDQ corporation, the smaller number of marketable fish 
species and greater distance to ongoing fishing activity, dramatically 
limited fisheries development options. Norton Sound asked Glacier 
Fish to analyze market opportunities for several runs of pink salmon, 
the even-year runs in particular, in the area that received little 
commercial attention. Using a pollock catcher-processor, Glacier 
Fish bought pink salmon from local fishers and processed them, with 
the same equipment used for pollock, into "deep skin blocks." These 
blocks are then, in turn, processed into "fish burgers" and other 
uniform portion food products similar to those made from whitefish. 
Expecting new market opportunities for the product, Glacier Fish, and 
several other companies, expanded their pink salmon buying efforts 
to other areas of Alaska in order to produce more "deep skin blocks" 
the following year. Norton Sound has started a further joint venture 
with Glacier Fish to ensure an annual market by buying and processing 
pink salmon from other areas during the odd years. 
5.2.3 RESOURCE BASE OF THE INSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
Greenland's history of fisheries management regimes has been much 
different than Alaska's. In general, the number of commercially 
significant species is much smaller and dominated by shrimp, and 
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management programs are much younger. Th
e GHRA established an 
ITQ system for the offshore shrimp fishery in 1991. 
At the same time, it 
adopted the capacity-points system for the in
shore fishery. The 
salmon fishery also has a licensing system, but 
the economic value of 
Greenland's salmon fishery is minuscule compa
red to that of shrimp. 
In 1992, the monetary returns were equal to .7
2% of the shrimp harvest 
(Flanders et al. 1995: 15). 
The management regime of the inshore shrimp
 fishery is not the result 
of a single united plan to restructure the econ
omy of the smaller 
towns and settlements of Greenland. Instead,
 it has developed over 
time as a series of responses to various econo
mic, biological, and 
political considerations. Many of the remaini
ng small settlements 
exist in their present location because of the c
od fishery. They were 
moved to take advantage of that resource. S
imilarly, some of the 
vessels in the fishery, particularly the small one
s, were built for the cod 
fishery and have since been adapted for shrim
p harvesting. While the 
GHRA and Greenlandic law recognize the imp
ortance of "economic 
and employment considerations in the fishing i
ndustry, the fish-
processing industry and other related trades," 
the goals of the inshore 
fishery are only partially development oriente
d ( Greenland Lansting 
199 6: 1 ) . Nonetheless, the fact remains that the inshore fi
shery is a 
major private employer in the remote regions of Greenla
nd, its small 
towns and settlements. 
The capacity-points system grew from a desire
 to conserve the shrimp 
stock and rationalize the fishery. At that time
, overcapacity, was 
increasing the effort-per-catch ratio, a sign of 
dwindling stocks. The 
large number of vessels with low-volume catch
es also reduced the 
overall value of the shrimp caught and increas
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Greenland's processing plants. The high frequency of low-volume 
catches decrease economies of scale for all phases of handling the 
shrimp. Further, the increased heterogeneity and instability of shrimp 
freshness, quality, and size, resulting from this problematic fleet 
structure, create similar difficulties (Poole 1995: 175) . 
When the system was adopted, the GHRA allotted 607 capacity 
points among all inshore fishers (Friis, P. pers. comm.). If a new fisher 
wished to enter the fishery, or a current participant wished to upgrade 
his vessel or equipment, he had to purchase a sufficient number of 
points from other fishers to account for the additional capacity. 
Figures obtained by the author indicate that the fleet structure 
changed primarily through a number of the smaller vessels exiting the 
fishing, most likely via the government capacity-points buy-out 
program (Olsen, J.B. pers. comm.). By 1995, 90 points worth of 
capacity had left the fishery. 
l Table 5.1, below, demonstrates that ownership of points by smaller 
I vessels reduced over time. 
I I Table 5.1: Capacity-Point Distribution by 
i Vessel Size from 1993-95 
Year <75 GRT 79'ers >80 GRT Total 
1993 492 78 7 577 
1994 480 78 7 565 
1995 412 78 27 517 
(Source: GHRA database) 
Similarly, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show an exodus of smaller vessels from the 
fishery. Most significantly, the number of vessels under 25 gross 
registered tons (GRT) dropped from 82 in 1993 to just 64 in 1995. 
According to the rules of the program, vessels above 80 GRT should 
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not be participating in the inshore fishery. Their presence in these 
tables indicates either an error in the database or a special case 
allowed by the GHRA (Rasmussen, R. 0. pers. comm.). 
Table 5.2: Number of Vessels with Capacity Points 
by Size In 1993 
GRT <5 p 6-10 P 11-15 P >15 P Total 
<25 76 6 82 
25.5-50 12 6 1 19 
51-75 4 7 3 4 18 
75.9-100 2 1 3 6 
Total 92 21 5 7 125 
(Source: GHRA database) 
Table 5.3: Number of Vessels with Capacity Points 
by Size in 1995 
GRT <5 p 6-10 P 11-15 P >15 P Total 
<25 60 4 64 
25.5-50 1 1 6 1 18 
51-75 3 6 3 3 15 
75.9-100 2 1 3 6 
Total 74 18 5 7 104 
(Source: GHRA database) 
The GHRA adopted an ITQ system for the inshore fishery in 1996, largely 
because the capacity-points system had not sufficiently changed the 
structure of the fishery and because of the system's built-in potential 
for "capital-stuffing" (Rosing, E. pers. comm.). Capital-stuffing occurs 
because old vessels leaving the fishery rarely perform to their 
predicted capacity and authorities cannot always predict the effects 
of rapidly developed new designs (Poole 1996: 361). An ITQ system 
operates in a similar fashion to the capacity-points system only it is 
based on outputs rather than inputs. In other words, it establishes a 
market for the right to catch fixed percentages of the annual TAC for 
a given fishery. 
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In order to own an ITQ for the inshore fishery, an individual or company 
must meet criteria that establish residency in Greenland and a history 
of participation in Greenlandic fisheries. Also, no single individual or 
company may own more than 10% of the total ITQs for the inshore 
fishery ( Greenland Lansting 1996: 5). These two aspects of the 
Greenlandic law appear to safeguard the fishery against foreign or 
monopolistic ownership. However, evidence from ITQ programs in the 
United States, Canada, and Iceland suggest that these are not the 
only worries for rural Greenlanders who wish to continue in the fishery. 
Fundamentally, the ITQ system is designed to rationalize a fishery by 
allowing more-efficient, and thereby more-profitable, fishers to 
purchase additional quota from less-efficient participants. At the 
same time, the sale offers an incentive, in the form of a cash payment 
for the quota, for less efficient fishers to leave the fishery. In 
accomplishing this objective, the market forces for ITQs obey most 
expected laws of economics. Accumulated capital and economies 
of scale favor larger, urban-based fishers and companies. In addition, 
if the TAC is reduced, all shareholders suffer but not equally. Holders of 
small quotas suffer from smaller profit margins, but larger shareholders 
can better weather reductions. 
As demonstrated in Iceland, home to one of the longest running ITQ 
systems, over time, fishing rights will be increasingly concentrated in 
the hands of the biggest actors involved (Poisson, G. and A. Helgason 
1995). Poisson and Helgason (Ibid. : 142) suggest that this process is 
"to some extent intrinsic to the ITQ system." Despite attempts to 
preserve equitable distribution of fishing rights, by both community 
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region, quota accumulated in the hands of a few companies (McCoy 
et al. 1995). Therefore, the system that currently invests residents of 
the smaller towns and settlements with the right to fish will transfer 
that right to wealthier individuals and companies, likely located in 
larger towns. In other words, if it functions according to its design, the 
ITQ system will most likely erode their resource base within a few years. 
Conversations with two Greenlandic officials confirmed that they 
foresee a similar result (Rosing, E. pers. comm.; Olsen, J.B. pers. 
comm.). With annual catches of the newer and larger vessels 
averaging approximately 1,000 tons, and the TAC for the inshore fleet 
averaging 23,000 tons, they informally estimate that 30 vessels will 
control the TAC for the inshore fishery in a few years. The buyout 
program that existed under the capacity-points system still operates 
but with additional funds and an enlarged mission. The public support 
arm of the Directorate of Fisheries, Hunting, and Agriculture has a 
further 10 million Danish kroner, or about $1 .72 million, in its annual 
budget for the next three years to offer as incentive for the exit of 
inefficient vessels or as financing to allow owners of smaller vessels to 
combine efforts aboard a single but newer and larger vessel (Olsen, 
J.B. pers. comm.). Obviously, some owners of smaller vessels may use 
this program to remain in the fishery, albeit as a partner rather than 
sole operator. However, most will not be able to continue to fish. 
The resource base of the inshore fishery is substantial, roughly one third 
of the total shrimp catch by domestic vessels in Greenlandic waters, 
as shown in Table 5.4. However, the monetary value of the inshore 
fishery is difficult to determine from available information. Statistics 
Greenland valued the total shrimp harvest in 1992 at 322 million 
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Danish (nominal) kroner, or approximately $50 million. This was a high 









Nominal Yearly Catch by 
Domestic-Fleet Components (in tons) 
Inshore Offshore Total Inshore Catch as 
Catch % of Total 
20,426 49554 63341 32% 
23,943 52834 69,511 34% 
25,789 58664 79,226 32% 
26,651 52280 69,814 38% 
27,359 53693 71,811 38% 
25,362 51900 68,329 37% 
(adapted from Hvingel. C. et. al. 1996: 7) 
The value of the inshore fishery is a somewhat smaller percentage of 
the total harvest value than the above figures might suggest, 
however. As indicated earlier, the instability in and heterogeneity of 
quality, freshness, and size reduce the value of the inshore catch. 
Furthermore, Royal Greenland, to whom the inshore fleet must deliver 
its catch, pays inshore fishers up to 25% less than the market price 
elsewhere in Northern Europe (Friis, P. pers. comm.). A smaller fleet of 
larger vessels should raise standards of quality and freshness and 
provide them on a more regular basis, raising the over all economic 
value of the fishery. 
5.2.4 CAPITAL IN THE INSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
Most of the capital for the inshore fleet originates from loans issued by 
the Directorate of Hunting, Fishing, and Agriculture. Unfortunately, 
though loans have been available on generous terms (Ibid.), they 
have not enabled fishers to become profitable or start new 
development enterprises. In fact, the easy availability of loans, 
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GHRA to move fishers out of the fishery under the capacity points 
system in the 1990s. In 1992, 90% of vessels in the inshore fishery were 
in arrears on loan payments. Moreover, 75 vessels were in not in a 
sufficient state of repair to justify further investment, though most 
owners of these vessels held loans on which they were unable to 
make payments. Fishers were reluctant to leave the fishery because 
they had few other cash-earning options. Due to the political 
sensitivity of repossessing a vessel by local authorities in the close-knit 
settlements and towns, authorities seldom exercised that option 
(Poole 1996). In effect, the loans amount to a subsidy of unprofitable 
participants, and facilitate little, if any, development. They assist 
continued participation in the fishery, but represented no avenue for 
fundamental change. 
Importantly, though loans from the Directorate of Hunting, Fishing, and 
Agriculture are only offered for commercial purposes (Olsen, J.B. pers. 
comm.), the vessels they secure are used for more purposes than just 
commercial fishing (Friis, P. pers. comm.). In many of the settlements, 
boats are a primary means of private transportation. Likewise, the 
Greenlanders use some of the same vessels, particularly the smaller 
ones, in hunting and fishing for both subsistence and the informal 
markets. The efforts of the GHRA to move smaller vessels out of the 
fishery by forgiving loans and offering incentives will close this source 
of capital and end this indirect subsidy of informal economic 
activities. 
Because returns are divided among so many individual and 
overwhelmingly unprofitable fishers, little development and 
enterprise is possible from the proceeds. Once the ITQ system has 
reduced the number of fishers, the remaining few may gain sufficient 
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profits to promote certain development interests, but these may likely 
reflect personal rather than community goals. The GHRA might levy a 
tax to capture some of the economic rent from the remaining 
fisherman and divert the revenue towards more public goals. 
However, an effort to tax the offshore fishery has resulted in little 
revenue due to market forces and its politically unpalatable nature 
(Poole 1995). 
Royal Greenland owns all of the sixteen major onshore processing 
plants in Greenland (Amason, R. and Friis, P. 1994: 199). Because it is a 
publicly-owned company, one might consider the processing facilities 
as part of the development structure of the inshore fishery that is 
available to rural residents. As noted in Chapter 3, the catches from 
the inshore fleet create the equivalent of 300-350 full-time processing 
positions. Though the GHRA has directed Royal Greenland to pursue 
social rather than purely economic goals at times (Poole 1995), 
market pressures and profit-seeking drive most of its actions. 
Company officials in Nuuk and Copenhagen, directing the workings of 
this large company, typify the "top-down" development decried in 
the community-development literature, and rural Greenlanders have 
little say in the company's decisions. 
5.3 EMPLOYMENT 
5.3.1 THE CDQ PROGRAM 
Table 5.5 summarizes both the annual and seasonal employment 
figures for the CDQ program. The employment provided by CDQ 
corporations and their subsidiaries does not amount to a large 
percentage of total employment for the region. This is particularly 
true on an annual basis, as shown in Table S.S. However, CDQ 
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participants employed in "basic" industry, consisting of private sector 
industries such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining~ construction, 
and manufacturing of both durable and nondurable goods. 
Table 5.5: CDQ Employment Compared to 1989 
'• CDQ CDQ CDQ Employment as 
Employment Employment as % of 1989 "Basic" 
% of 1989 Employment 
Employment 
1993 averaae 173 3% 25% 
1994 averaa e 387 6% 57% 
1993 hiqhest q uarter 213 3% 31% 
1994 hiahest q uarter 761 12% 112% 
{adapted from State of Alaska 1995: 33) 
Basic industries "usually produce goods or services for sale outside a 
region." (State of Alaska 1995: 33) 
Table 5.6, below, shows the number of shareholders employed on 
catcher-processor and processor vessels. Some of this employment is 
directly related to catching pollack CDQs, but residents of the region 
have also become more active in the overall industry since the 
inception of the program (Townsend 1996: 25). 
Table 5.6: CDQ Shareholders Employed 
on Pollock-Processor Vessels in 1994 
Corporation # Employed 
APICDA 05 
Bristol Bay 88 
Central Bering Sea 26 
Coastal Villages 40 
Norton Sound 85 
Yukon Delta 39 
Total 283 
{adapted from Townsend 1996: 55) 
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APICDA and Central Bering Sea place less emphasis on this activity, 
and fewer of their shareholders seek and hold jobs on these vessels. 
This is most likely the result of better economic conditions in the 
Aleutian/Pribilof Islands region and longer contact with the industry, 
which is mainly based out of Dutch Harbor/Unalaska and Akutan 
(/bid.). Known as a"slime line," processing work is notoriously 
unattractive and often worked by immigrants or foreign workers. 
All six corporations have used employment to reduce alcohol and 
drug abuse among shareholders (/bid.). Employment on catcher-
processors requires pre-employment drug-testing and, once aboard, 
maintaining a drug-free workplace. CDQ corporations use training 
programs to the same effect. 
5.3.2 THE INSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
Employment figures for the Greenland's inshore shrimp fishery are 
more difficult to obtain. However, some general observations can be 
made. Based on field work done in 1991 and 1992, Poole ( 1995: 171), 
noted that the inshore fleet consisted of 140 to 150 vessels and 
directly employed 750 fishers during the fishing season. Tables 5.2 and 
5.3 indicate that 125 vessels held inshore capacity points in 1993 and 
104 in 1995, suggesting dramatic reductions in employment over that 
time period. 
Crew member totals are not available for all of the 95 vessels, listed in 
Appendix 1, that hold inshore ITQs in 1997. Taking an average of the 
number of crew per vessel, in three size classes (<25 GRT, 25-74.9 GRT, 
and~ 75 GRT) that do report the number of crew, and applying it to all 
members of that class, and then an average of all three classes for 
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approximate figure of 455 fishers employed seasonally in 1997. As 
mentioned earlier, Greenlandic officials informally estimate that 30 
relatively new vessels above 7 5 GRT will hold all the ITQ for the fishery 
in a few years. Using a crew number of seven, obtained by averaging 
the number of crew for vessels in that size category, this suggests that 
the inshore fishery will create direct seasonal employment for roughly 
210 people. 
Table 5.7: Inshore Fishers as% of Labor Force 
Year Inshore % of Estimated % of Estimated % of 1994 Non-
Fishers 1994 Total 1994 Total Government 
Labor Force Employment Workers 
1992 750 2.7% 3.3% 4.5% 
1997 455 1.6% 1.96% 2.8% 
??? 210 .74% .91% 1.2% 
(sources: Statistics Greenland 1995: 75: 
GHRA database, displayed in Appendix 1) 
Table 5.7 expresses employment in the inshore fishery over time as a 
percentage of the estimated total force, estimated total number of 
employed persons, and estimated non-government workers (including 
the GHRA, kommunes, Danish authorities, and public corporations). 
As seens in Table 5.7, the capacity-points system has reduced 
employment, and the ITQ system should continue that trend, perhaps 
stabilizing around 210 seasonal positions. 
5.4 SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
Revisiting Young's adaptation of the sustainable development model. 
Figure 5.1 shows the CDQ program situated more strongly in the 
nonsocial, environmental and economic area, with some exceptions. 
Pollock is the primary catch and economic mainspring of the 
program, and the pollock is caught by partner companies for export 
markets. Local shareholders who work and train on partner company 
vessels must obey the patterns and values of the commercial system. 
76 
Chapter 5: Analysis 
However, outside this core activity, opportunities for more culturally 
appropriate development can occur. Five of the six CDQ groups 
themselves are incorporated as nonprofit companies, and all of them, 
though obviously affected by market forces, have some leeway for 
crafting flexible work schedules, that allow for time for subsistence 
activities, and organizational structures that fit more comfortably 
within preferred patterns. 
Figure 5.1: The CDQ Program Model 
Social System 
The number of people that each corporation actually employs is fairly 
minimal though. On the positive side, several of the smaller 
enterprises they have generated, such as the local fleets to catch 
their halibut quota, are able to utilize more traditional modes of 
production. 
Figure 5.2: The Inshore Shrimp Fishery Model 
Social System 
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The inshore fishery, modeled in Figure 5.2, falls within the same general 
area but includes more appropriate social organization. Like Alaskan 
pollock, shrimp caught in Greenlandic waters are also destined for 
export, and the dictates of the market pervade much of the fishery. 
However, because the fishery is limited to smaller vessels and inshore 
waters, crew sizes are generally quite small. Often the boat owner 
and captain are one and the same person, and the skipper employs 
one or two relatives or neighbors as his crew. In such a small crew, the 
relationship need not be strictly hierarchical and can be based on 
more traditional, egalitarian patterns. 
Applying Ross and Usher's characteristics of formal economic activity, 
shown in Table 4.1, we see that both the CDQ program and the GISF 
contain many elements of the formal economy. Without going 
through each point separately, all more or less apply to the CDQ 
program, though, as noted above, the local fisheries based on halibut 
CDQs and other species offer a chance for less hierarchical 
organization and more traditional methods of work production. As for 
the inshore fishery, while individual fishers' current fishing and business 
practices may not fit most of the characteristics in Table 5.8, the 
capacity points system and the new ITQ system dramatically favor 
formal activity. 
In a study of several Yupik villages in Alaska's Bristol Bay, Harris (1987: 
161-180) discusses how economic and social relationships between 
generations are affected by an intrusive economic system. He notes 
that, because of education opportunities and fewer ties to the 
traditional economy, the younger generations normally adapt more 
quickly to the wage economy and, as a result, hold more economic 
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with the older generation, relegating elders to a social and economic 
backwater. In a few villages where most of the adult males had 
successfully retained their limited-entry permits, the older generation 
effectively maintained their authority. Because fishing represented a 
better opportunity than wage jobs, the younger generation had to 
appease the old in order to continue in the fishery and, perhaps, one 
day inherit a permit. This appeasement secured the persistence of 
traditional social order and allowed village elders to dictate the 
pace of change. This controlled path to change resulted in a lower 
incidence of outmigration by the younger generation, alcohol and 
drug abuse by all community members, and lower crime rates (Ibid.: 
17 6). 
The formal economic nature of the CDQ suggests that the younger 
generation may find a larger role in the six CDQ groups. However, 
because this attractive source of income is tied to the village, 
traditional community social structures, and, through them, older 
generations, may maintain a certain amount of control over the CDQ 
corporations. In the case of the inshore shrimp fishery, ITQs have some 
potential to function like the limited-entry permits in the villages in 
Harris' study. The problem lies in the fact that market forces, and the 
buy-out incentive programs, will likely take this source of economic 
strength out of the settlements altogether. Unfortunately, sufficient 
data do not exist to allow application of Harris' approach to the two 
study areas. This represents a potentially rewarding area for future 
study of the two programs. 
In the Canadian and American fisheries studied by McCoy et al. 
(1995), they note changed social relations between crew and owners 
under the ITQ systems. In both cases, most vessel owners reduced the 
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crews' share after the start of the ITQ system. The few that did not 
mainly hired kin, or close friends and neighbors. Larger firms strongly 
exhibited this behavior, and many justified it by virtue of having to 
pay for the financing of new ITQs. McCoy et al. suggest that, "in 
effect, the crew is paying for the purchase or leasing of ITQ." (Ibid.: 
101) With the reduced need for labor in the fishery, crew had little 
bargaining power to maintain their former level of wages. Leasing of 
ITQs occurs not only in the Scotia-Fundy, and has become an 
important feature of the Icelandic ITQ system system (Poisson and 
Helgason 1995: 135). The Greenland ITQ system forbids profit-driven 
speculation and leasing of ITQs. Therefore, one should not expect the 
"tenancy" system that emerged in Iceland, in which small boat 
owners had to resort to fishing leased quota on poor terms to 
continue in the fishery, to appear in the inshore shrimp fishery. 
However, because of the concentration of ITQs, one might expect a 
similar devaluation of wage levels and crew bargaining power as 
exhibited in the Canadian and American fisheries. 
In both cases, fishing is largely a seasonal activity. The difference in 
employment levels between the highest quarter and the yearly 
averages in Table 5.5 illustrate the seasonal nature of employment for 
CDQ shareholders. In Alaska, pollock is caught during two separate 
seasons, and the CDQs for pollock can be caught at any time of the 
year. Therefore, the potential exists for CDQ shareholders working on 
partner vessels and/or small boat fleets for halibut and other species 
to spend several months per year fishing. Although the flexibility exists 
for the corporations to structure operations as they wish, the seasons, 
which are set by the state and the NPFMC, dictate much of the 
timing. In most of Greenland, ice conditions prevent year-round 
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concentration of ITQs over the coming years should contribute to a 
smaller number of people working for a longer period of the available 
season. 
5.5 SKILLS 
Lyck and Taagholt ( 1987) suggest that education is one of the keys to 
the continuing development of Greenland . The issue at stake for all 
residents of remote regions is whether or not they will be able to fully 
participate in development based on resources in their region (Young 
1995). Langdon 's discussion ( 1987) of near-shore, commercial salmon 
and herring fisheries in Western Alaska notes that the activity builds 
on many traditional weather-related, boat-handling, and harvesting 
skills. Some of these same skills may transfer to the larger vessels used 
to harvest pollock CDQs and the larger shrimp trawlers favored by the 
ITQ system. However, many new skills are needed. 
5.5.1 THE CDQ PROGRAM 
In Alaska, and the rest of the United States, students seeking higher 
education and vocational educational after secondary school must 
pay for them. As a result, the skills learned in such courses remain in 
short supply in the cash-poor, remote regions of Alaska. A major focus 
of all six CDQ groups has been education and training. Most have 
scholarship funds for residents of their areas and all provide some 
forms of technical training. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 give a summary of the 
courses and opportunities provided by the CDQ corporations for 
residents of the entire CDQ region. For an area of approximately 
20,000 residents, the opportunities provided by the CDQ program 
represent a substantial contribution to skill acquisition. 
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Table 5.8: Higher- and Vocational- Education 
Opportunities provided by the CDQ Program 
Hlaher Education 1992-93 1994 Totals 
Undergraduate College 64 112 176 
and University 
Vocational Education 
Aluminum Boat Fabrication 0 18 18 
Auto and Diesel Technology 0 4 4 
Biomedical Electronic 0 l l 
Technician 
Business Management 0 8 8 
Carpenter 0 l l 
Paralegal 0 2 2 
Power Plant Operation 0 l 1 
Seafood Industry Management 0 2 2 
Travel Specialist 0 1 1 
Totals 0 38 38 
(adapted from State of Alaska 1995: 40) 
Table 5.9: Technical-Training Opportunities 
Provided by the CDQ Program 
Technical Tralnlna 1992-93 1994 Totals 
Processor Workers 161 44 205 
Vessel Safety 49 92 141 
Fishing Training 47 90 137 
Computer Applications 30 151 181 
Electronic Navigation 26 65 91 
Equipment Operation 23 28 51 
Mechanics/Welding 14 51 65 
Grants Management 12 12 24 
Clerical 6 15 21 
Emergency Medical Service 5 0 5 
HAZWOP 1 0 1 
Baker 0 1 1 
Marine Firefighting 0 1 1 
Industrial Refrigeration 0 1 1 
HVAC 0 2 2 
Totals 375 552 927 
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5.5.2 THE INSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
In Greenland, the Home Rule authority provides for all education and 
training opportunities. A student need only qualify and express an 
interest. 
Table 5.10 
Graduates from Paamuit Navigation School 
Basic Navigation Basic Navigation Ship Dragnet 
A B Assistant Making 
1993/4 1 0 3 3 
1994/5 0 1 0 12 
1995/6 0 0 3 22 
Totals 1 1 6 37 
Table 5.11 
Graduates from Maniitsoq Fishing-Industry School 
Fishing Assistant Fishing Industry Fishing Industry 
Assistant Technician 
1993/4 34 30 4 
1994/5 0 16 4 
1995/6 0 2 4 
Totals 34 48 12 
Tables 5. 11 through 5.15 demonstrate the number of graduates from 
fisheries-related courses. These figures show all graduates, not just 
those from kommunes that have participants in the inshore fishery, 
and come from Statistics Greenland records (Danielsen, M. pers. 
comm.). The list is selective and does not include all vocational, 
technical, and higher educational graduates, merely those most 
directly related to fishing activities. The courses vary in length from 
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Table 5.12 
Graduates from lllulissat Ship-Masters School 
Fishing Boat Coasting Home-Trade 
Master Master Master 
1993/4 18 3 0 
1994/5 9 2 0 
1995/6 13 1 6 
Totals 40 6 6 
Table 5.13 
Graduates from Nuuk Ship-Masters School 
Fishing Boat Master Ship Engineer 
1993/4 13 6 
1994/5 7 1 
1995/6 10 4 
Totals 30 11 
Table 5.14 







5.6 POLITICAL VIABILITY 
5.6.1 THE CDQ PROGRAM 
Ship Master Fishing Ship 
Engineer Technology Master 
2 0 2 
1 1 2 
3 1 4 
Thus far, the CDQ program has not attracted serious opposition. The 
low profile of the program has left it with few political foes. Fisheries 
management regimes do not make for exciting television, and the 
rest of the country is largely ignorant of the program's existence. In 
Alaska, resource debates figure more prominently in daily life and 
often involve fierce contests and entrenched philosophical camps. 
However, even there the program is not widely known outside the 
affected area. During the debate over the reauthorization of the 
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Magnusson Act in the summer of 1996, several large-scale fishing 
companies that own and operate catcher-processors in the Bering 
Sea pollock fishery spoke against the program in congressional 
hearings (Anchorage Daily News 1996: B-3). However, their efforts did 
not endanger the act's passage or the continuation of the CDQ 
program. The program has the support of the three Alaskan members 
of congress, all of whom hold senior leadership positions in the 
dominant party's organization, particularly with respect to natural 
resource issues. 
Overall, the CDQ program has generated little conflict. In its 
calculation of the TAC for Bering Sea pollock, the NPFMC included a 
15% margin of error, or "conservation" reserve. When the program 
began, the pollock CDQs, 7 .5% of the TAC, were withdrawn from that 
reserve (Hamm, D. pers. comm.). Likewise, the NPFMC adopted CDQs 
for halibut and sablefish at the same time it instituted an ITQ system in 
what had formerly been open, derby-style fisheries. Therefore, no one 
gave up their right to fish in order for the CDQ corporations to enter 
the fishery; the program has not been a zero-sum game. Moreover, 
five of the six CDQ groups lease their quota to catcher-processors at 
highly competitive rates. The sixth formed a joint venture with a 
vessel owner already in the fishery. In effect, the partner companies 
are able to catch more fish. They simply have to pay to catch those 
extra fish, and so far they have shown a willingness to pay that price. 
Most of the market value of fish is added by processing, and, as a 
result, the partner companies still make substantial returns from the 
CDQs. 
The potential exists for the CDQ program to become linked to the 
ongoing debate over rural Alaskans' preferential right to fish and 
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game for subsistence harvests. In essence, both the CDQ program 
and federal subsistence law afford rural and Native Alaskans superior 
access to renewable resources. Urban-based, and mostly sport, 
f hunters and fishers denounce the preferential treatment rural 
Alaskans receive. Race is involved in the issue because of the federal 
government's role in overseeing Native affairs. The subsistence 
priority was originally intended just for Natives, but Alaska's 
congressional delegation successfully amended the priority to rural, in 
an attempt to avoid racial conflict. 
So far this linkage has not happened, perhaps because most Alaskans 
are not directly competing with CDQ groups for pollock, halibut, or 
sablefish. Also, the Alaskan attitude about vessels from the "lower 48" 
reaping benefits from Alaskan waters has probably contributed to the 
lack of conflict. Most Alaskans look unkindly upon factory trawlers. 
Typically owned by large Seattle-based concerns or food industry 
barons like the billionaire Frank Tyson and known for low wages and 
harsh working conditions, they garner little sympathy. As the program 
expands, this remains a serious potential threat to its longevity, 
though. The subsistence debate has raged off and on for twenty years 
and is a constant source of contention. Both sides hold what have 
proved to be intractable positions. Only the threat of federal 
management of many state fisheries has periodically brought the 
sides together to look for solutions. Indeed, the subjects of Native 
sovereignty and Native rights divide the state like few others. 
5.6.2 THE INSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
Greenland's inshore shrimp fishery presents a different set of 
challenges. The racial divide seen in Alaska resource c;:Jebates does 
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Greenland note the differences and prejudices between the regional 
and cultural affiliations (Nuttall 1992), the two places are not alike in 
this regard. Instead, the ITQ system may face public opposition like 
that which has developed in Iceland. Fishing activities form the basis 
of private industry in both countries and account for an overwhelming 
share of their export-oriented economies (Poole 1995; Amason 1995). 
In Iceland, the ITQ programs, instituted in 1982 and amended in 1990, 
have engendered serious opposition. Neither the "quota-kings" and 
"lords of the sea" that now control the ITQ shares nor the ITQ systems 
themselves are viewed with favor. Icelanders' symbolic notions of 
personal freedom, social equity, and national sovereignty appear to 
conflict with the idea of privatized natural resource rights (Poisson 
and Helgason 1995). In 1994 and 1995, fishermen held national strikes 
against the system, and national surveys demonstrate strong 
disapproval of the inequitable distribution of public resources. Some 
observers note that the efficacy of the system may ultimately be 
jeopardized by moral disapproval and lack of public acceptance 
(Ibid.). 
Opposition to ITQs has not yet emerged on a similar scale in 
Greenland. It may not. However, strong cultural ties to land and 
resources on a community and personal level do not appear to mesh 
well with market-based privatization schemes like ITQs. With no 
apparent alternatives, rural Greenlanders may not appreciate being 
denied a significant stake in the country's primary industry. 
Concentration of fishing rights in more urban towns could also 
exacerbate rural-urban tensions. In any case, additional 
unemployment in the already depressed rural settlements and small 
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Barbier's ( 1987) caution about the difficulties of modeling sustainable 
development is particularly relevant. The mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative values in the two programs analyzed in Chapter Five make 
precise comparison difficult. Moreover, there is no secret formula 
because the individual circumstances of each program and the 
desires of the participants are not the same. However, based on the 
criteria used in this thesis, we can distinguish clear differences 
between the design and effects of the Western Alaska CDQ program 
and the Greenland inshore shrimp fishery. 
The CDQ program is a single coordinated effort between state and 
federal officials to actively involve indigenous residents of Western 
Alaskan coastal villages in several phases of commercial fishing. It 
targets an area with a history of systematic, exclusion of Native fishers 
from commercial fisheries. Experiences with the limited-entry permit 
system, and the resulting migration of permits to urban Alaska, in 
particular, tempered its design. As a result, it bestows community-
based rights to resources, instead of individual-based ownership. 
Further, the designers and administrators appear to have generally 
heeded the suggestions of academics and indigenous people in 
constructing the program. The State of Alaska anticipates various 
routes to community development for each CDQ region, and allows 
each corporation to exercise a fair amount of control over its own 
destiny. Importantly, the resource base, and the capital that comes 
from its utilization, appear to enable a significant amount of 
employment, investment in infrastructure, and fostering of new skills 
for participants and residents of the region. The free reign given by 
the state permits tailoring of work production and organization to 
locally preferred patterns, but the formal economic nature of much of 
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far, the CDQ program has avoided attracted any damaging political 
opposition, but, as with all resource regimes, it may yet arise. The 
political difficulties of allowing investment outside of fisheries-related 
ventures offers a case in point. 
The Greenland inshore shrimp fishery is not a planned development 
program, but it functions, for rural Greenlanders, as a primary resource 
base for employment and development. The Greenland Home Rule 
Authority has faced a dilemma over the restructuring of the inshore 
shrimp fishery fleet. The large number of old and under-performing 
vessels reduce the overall value of the resource. In addition, current 
overcapacity in the fishery has raised concerns about the long-term 
health of stocks. In response, the Home Rule Authority adopted two 
successive individual- and market- based regimes. The capacity-
points system, adopted in 1991, began the concentration of the right-
to-fish among fewer and fewer people. The ITQ system, adopted in 
1996, should complete that process, reducing the number of vessels 
from 140-50 to approximately 30. 
While this should increase efficiency and raise the value of the 
resource, the restructuring of the fleet has serious consequences for 
life in the small towns and settlements of Greenland. It limits access 
to a primary resource base for an area with few alternatives. The loan 
program, open to commercial fishers, did not enable returns sufficient 
to start other development projects. While the loans hamper current 
efforts to restructure the fleet, they did, in effect, subsidize local 
informal economic activity such as subsistence, and small-scale 
commercial, hunting and fishing. The fishery does allow for preferred 
models of work production and organization, but the capacity-points 






Chapter Six: Conclusion 
methods. Questions of social equity have troubled ITQ systems 
elsewhere, though they have not yet affected its implementation in 
Greenland. 
The two market-based resource regimes in Greenland have shifted, 
and will continue to shift, control over resources out of the rural areas. 
Market-based resource regimes appear to have similar effects as 
markets in general, they do not favor remote regions. This is because 
of the inherent qualities of remote regions, such as the lack of capital 
and formal economic skills. When rural fishers make the economically 
rational act, they lose the future right to fish and control over their 
resource base. Hence, it appears that we should not expect purely 
market-based regimes to foster community development. 
The community-based rights of the CDQ system do not permit the 
transfer of resource rights to other areas and allow communities to 
maintain control over their resource base. Moreover, the CDQ system 
operates within a larger market-based resource regime. The NPFMC 
manages both halibut and sablefish with ITQs, and the quota structure 
of the pollack CDQs appears to easily mesh with an ITQ system, should 
it be adopted for that fishery. While the CDQ program is still in its 
infancy, it demonstrates that community development of remote 
regions can occur under the right circumstances and offers some 
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Vessels of the Greenland Inshore Sh~imp Fishery -1997 
Registration # Name Call Sign Tonnage BulH Size 
Yearly # ofCrew 
'92 '93 '94 '95 '96 
mean 
GR 1 - 069 lmaq XP2115 17.15 1962 s 3.00 3.00
 
GR 1 - 168 KJDoq OVTP 41.10 1988 s 4.00 4.0
0 
GR 2 - 122 Bingo II XP2298 19.98 1956 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 2 - 142 Lalla OXAA 0 ? 
GR 2 - 166 C.N. Olsen II OWES 209.00 1988 79 5.00 5.00 
GR 2 - 167 Maren Olsen XP2487 19.81 1965 s 
GR 2 - 177 AbHdleraq OU4708 19.80 1988 s 4.40 
4.40 
GR 2 - 189 AngajorlH XP2187 15.23 1963 s 
GR 3 - 060 K.B. Olesen XP220S 19.99 1960 s 
GR 3 - 068 lsungaq OUTI 70.87 1976 s 5.00 5.00
 
GR 3 - 070 Kaklllsak OWVQ 113.90 1986 ? 5.00 5.00 
GR 3 - 073 Hans David OWGZ 37.20 1987 s 
GR 3 - 075 Putooruttoq OU4282 19.90 1988 s 4.00 
4.00 
GR 3 - 079 P. Nielsen OWXI 40.20 1987 s 4.33 
4.33 
GR s - 109 Fortuna XP2040 14.33 1962 s 
GR s - 123 K.S. Meller XP2372 19.99 1964 s 
GR s 214 Akato XP4407 19.97 1982 s 4.00 4.00 
GR s - 228 Qlngaaq OWMZ 209.00 1988 79 




Vessels of the Greenland Inshore Shrimp Fishery 1997 
Registration # Name Call Sign Tonnage Built Size 
Yearly # ofCrew 
'92 '93 '94 '95 '96 m
ean 
GR 6 . 220 Lasarus OZTJ 149.73 1979 ? 
GR 6 . 288 Qarsaaq ouuc 78.10 1985 ? 
GR 6 . 308 Gala II OVUB 74.98 1974 s 5.00 4.80 4.97 
GR 6 . 308 Gala Ill OVXD 191.50 1988 79 
GR 6 . 355 Tobias Noahsen OZJO 79.71 1981 ? 7.00 7.00 
GR 6 . 368 Najagtaa XP2376 19.97 1964 s 4.00 2.90 3.64 
GR 6 . 406 Jarte OVUI 40.60 1987 s 4.20 3.83 4.17 
GR 6 . 410 Marie Egede OYNH 19.85 1963 s 2.00 3.33 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.17 
GR 6 . 420 Lady OYOE 36.33 1959 s 4.00 4.00 4.00 
GR 7 . 021 Dorte lngeman ovuc 69.74 1969 s 4.63 4.00 4.60 
GR 7 . 119 Emerllt 5QNW 19.99 1961 s 3.83 4.00 3.83 
GR 7 . 129 N. Blrglthe OXDH 23.97 1962 s 3.90 3.90 
GR 7 . 184 Jessen XP3232 19.99 1975 s 4.20 4.20 
GR 7 . 190 Jakob Olsen XP2192 15.23 1963 s 3.80 3.80 
GR 7 . 198 Karo OXPZ 68.88 1980 s 6.60 6.60 
GR 7 . 216 Anase OUHK 158.70 1983 ? 6.88 6.88 
GR 7 . 221 Karl Frederlk XP2808 19.80 1968 s 3.88 3.88 
GR 7 . 225 Jaqqu OU3482 19.90 1986 s 4.64 4.00 4.64 
GR 7 . 226 Basse OU3644 19.90 1986 s 4.75 
4.75 
-___ -
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Vessels of the Greenland Inshore Shrimp Fishery 1997 
Registration # Name Call Sign Tonnage Built Size 
Yearly # ofCrew 
'92 '93 '94 '95 '96 
mean 
GR 7 - 228 Qlllaq OYKA 209.00 1988 79 
GR 7 - 230 Aallpaaraq OU5421 14.90 1991 s 4.73 
4.73 
GR 7 - 239 Smaragd OU3434 19.90 1986 s 
4.00 4.00 
GR 7 - 241 Soml OWHD 67.03 1971 s 
GR 8 - 137 Qatanngutlgllt XPA4752 19.09 1959 s 4.00 
4.00 
GR 8 - 184 Angerdla N. T. XP2497 19.49 1965 s 3.80 
3.80 
GR 8 . 196 Marte Olsen XPNN 19.91 1967 s 3.00 
3.00 
GR 8 . 215 Larseraq XP2872 17.48 1976 s 3.90 
3.90 
GR 8 . 259 Rosa Rune OVOG 37.20 1987 s 4.29 
4.29 
GR 8 . 264 E.H. Lennert OXMV 62.78 1959 s 5.17 
5.17 
GR 8 - 275 Asummlut OUYI 117.30 1986 ? 
GR 8 . 280 MiHu XP2661 19.62 1966 s 3.80 
3.80 
GR 8 - 307 Rosa Linda OUQC 25.50 1985 s 
GR 8 . 309 Mattaaraq OYYH 72.67 1981 s 
GR 9 . 103 Chartotte Olsen 5POC 18.13 1959 s 4.27 
4.27 
GR 9 - 112 Aslmlo XP2374 19.92 1964 s 3.32 
3.32 
GR 9 . 132 Pele Lars XP2190 19.99 1963 s 3.00 
3.00 
GR 9 . 135 J.A. Oline OU3189 12.90 1986 s 3.29 
3.29 




Vessels of the Greenland Inshore Shrimp Fishery 1997 
Registration # Name Call Sign Tonnage Built Size 
'92 
Yearly # ofCrew 
'93 '94 '95 '96 mean 
GR 10 - 178 G. Frantz Olsen ozu 33.56 1976 s 
GR 10 - 187 Kattanguaq 5QDI 15.94 1965 s 3.22 3.22 
GR 11 - 042 David XP2711 16.29 1967 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 11 - 055 Ole Karl OZCB 25.07 1961 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 11 - 063 Kuluk XP3290 19.99 1975 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 11 . 070 LarsOle 5QNV 19.99 1961 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 11 - 071 Sussl OZIQ 57.64 1964 s 4.92 4.92 
GR 11 - 080 Peda OZRS 29.98 1966 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 11 - 081 Lars Karl OWMO 85.10 1986 ? 4.95 4.95 
GR 11 - 082 lsak K. owuw 27.90 1986 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 11 - 086 Soqqaq OU5768 19.80 1990 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 11 - 087 Najatuaq U04683 0 ? 
GR 11 - 088 Aannguaq OU6570 0 ? 
GR 12 - 061 Karl Blrglthe XP2626 16.24 1966 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 12 - 065 Anaanaq ozcc 25.07 1961 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 12 - 096 Marke J. OU4967 34.47 1987 s 
GR 12 - 098 Katrl OVTJ 69.87 1968 s 
GR 12 - 099 Lea OWGY 26.45 1962 s 
GR 12 - 125 Nlcolaat 5QIV 19.91 1961 s 
.. ~ ~-~ ,_ 
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Vessels of the Greenland Inshore Shrimp Fishery 1997 
Registration # Name Call Sign Tonnage Built Size 
Yearly # ofCrew 
'92 '93 '94 '95 '96 mean 
GR 12 
-
128 Karl Jakob OZIS 46.17 1977 s 
GR 12 
-
133 Marianne OUTE 66.19 1975 s 5.00 5.00 
GR 12 
-
177 Malamuk XP5124 19.26 1981 s 5.00 5.00 
GR 12 
-
192 Aleqa OWWH 118.70 1988 ? 
GR 12 - 194 Erimaat om 188.90 1988 79 
GR 12 - 196 Janeraq A. OXKX 78.10 1989 ? 7.00 6.00 6.86 
GR 12 - 208 Papik OUHE 119.40 1989 ? 7.00 7.00 
GR 12 - 210 Fenja Slegstad OZCY 78.10 1990 ? 7.00 7.00 
GR 12 - 212 lmerlssoq OULB 209.00 1990 79 7.00 7.00 
GR 12 - 215 Mathiesen OVOP 119.40 1991 ? 7.52 7.52 
GR 12 
-
220 Aallsartoq OVUP 0 ? 7.00 7.00 
GR 12 - 222 Ammak OXHJ 24.58 1962 s 
GR 14 - 049 Elisabeth L OVYI 46.30 1988 s 4.33 4.33 
GR 14 - 066 Hjertlnnguaq OYGI 45.38 1976 s 
GR 14 - 068 Mary West XP2521 19.95 1965 s 4.00 4.00 
GR 14 - 074 Nllse 5QOP 19.96 1961 s 2.00 2.00 
GR 14 - 081 Qavak OVOJ 192.30 1988 79 
GR 14 
-
089 Emltslaq OU5938 18.80 1990 s 5.00 5.00 








Appendix Two: Greenland Kommunes 
# Kommune Danish Name ISF 
1 Nanortalik X 
2 Qaqortoq Julianehaab X 
3 Narsaq X 
5 Paamiut Frederikshaab X 
6 Nuuk Godthaab X 
7 Manitsoq Sukkertoppen X 
8 Sismiut Hosteinsborg X 
9 Kangaatsiaq X 
10 Aasiaaat Egedesminde X 
1 1 Qasigiannguit Christianshaab X 
12 llulissat Jakobshavn X 




This table displays all Greenlandic kommunes and their Danish names 
where applicable. Kommunes with vessels from the inshore shrimp 
fleet are identified with an "X." 
